The ARYAN PATH

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CONTENTS

THE RE-EMERGING PATTERN (EDITORIAL) 241
THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE—II—*By Bhikshu Sangharakshita* 243
SRADDHA AND JNANA: THE RELATION OF FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE—*By Frank Fowler Conlon* 249
THE MIND'S WINDOW (POEM)—*By Herbert Bluen* 252
THE RIGHT ATTITUDE—*By Indra Chandra Shastri* 253
PERENNIAL MUTINEER (POEM)—*By Dorothy Ellin Flax* 257
FROM RELIGION TO HUMANISM—*By Noshir Bilpodiwala* 258
LINEN AND INKHORN THE WRITER (POEM)—*By Lila Ray* 261
JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION—*By Shamsuddin* 262
ROBINSON CRUSOE AND HIS PROTOTYPE: REFLECTIONS ON FICTION AND REALITY —*By R. L. Megroz* 266
NEW BOOKS AND OLD—
THE ABIDING PROBLEMS—*By B. G. Cooper* 271
REVIEWS—*By D. S. Maxted, H. G. Narahari, Basil A. Yeaxlee, M. Kaye, Kenneth Walker, Dilip Kumar Sen, Sister Vajira, B. Ch. Chhabra, H. J. Fyrth, E. V. Hayes, Vivian Worthington, Sylva Norman, K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar, H. M. Lishman, K. Viswanatham, C. V. H. Rao and L. Marr* 272
A LETTER FROM LONDON—*By Sunder Kabadi* 283
ENDS AND SAYINGS 286

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Editor: SOPHIA WADIA

Assistant Editor: RAMESHCHANDRA SIRKAR

ADDRESSES

Editorial Office:	"THEOSOPHY HALL" 40, New Marine Lines Bombay 1
Managerial Office:	No. 1/1, Bugle Rock Road Basavangudi Bangalore 4
London Office:	62, Queen's Gardens London, W. 2
Indian Institute of World Culture	No. 6, Shri B. P. Wadia Road Basavangudi Bangalore 4

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and lost among the host — as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXXIII JUNE 1962 No. 6

THE RE-EMERGING PATTERN

[WE reprint this editorial from THE ARYAN PATH, December 1942.—ED.]

THREE CENTURIES ago this year saw, on January 8th, the death of one great scientist, Galileo Galilei, and the birth of another, Isaac Newton, on Christmas Day, 1642.

Galileo with his heliocentric theory, and Newton with his theory of gravitation, have exerted a profound influence on modern thought. All honour to both for their honesty, their open-mindedness, their courage and their industry! It is not to detract from any of these to recognize that the discoveries for which posterity honours both were not original but were restatements of truths once well known. For, as Newton himself wrote, "Restatement is a service only less valuable than inspiration itself."

Galileo's theory of the elemental vortices had been taught by Anaxagoras two thousand years before. The law of vortical movement in primordial matter was in fact learned by the Greeks from the Egyptians. They had it from the Chaldeans, who in turn had been the pupils of the Brahmins of India. Aryabhatta, the earliest astronomer of India, calculated the revolution of the earth as scientifically as Archimedes and the modern astronomers. The Greek astronomer Aristarchus of Samos in the third century B.C. taught that the earth revolves around the sun and "moveth circularly about her own centre." Pythagoras had brought the teaching three centuries before from Middle Asia where it had been taught for many ages.

Galileo availed himself of the Pythagorean manuscripts, with whose doctrines Newton also was familiar. Galileo, moreover, was anticipated nearer his own day in some of his theories, not only by Copernicus but also by William Gilbert of Colchester. Newton found most valuable

clues in the writings of that mediæval mystic and "nursling of the genii" Jacob Boehme. Newton's profound mind, reading between Boehme's lines, was able to fathom his spiritual thought and to translate it for the scientific thinker.

Sir Isaac, one of the most religious men of his day, could fortunately not foresee the uses to which his teachings would long be put by the upholders of a mechanistic universe. Newton held to the Pythagorean corpuscular theory, and what is his "exceedingly rare ethereal medium" but the Ether of the ancients? The direction in which his great mind was working is evident from his leaving open the question whether the agent causing gravity is material or immaterial. This, with a liberal interpretation of his personal *working* God, opens the door to the ancient conception of guiding and operative *intelligences* behind the natural forces. His theory of gravitation itself, faulty because incomplete, echoes however feebly the doctrine of magnetic attraction and repulsion.

The great Pattern of the manifested universe, and of the evolutionary scheme in the impersonal and universal Mind, was grasped by the first Scientists. It was handed down in trust to their successors and by them recorded. But time and superstition made a jigsaw puzzle of the Cosmic Plan, as far as the perception of men in general was concerned. Since then, the effort of successive generations of seekers, who inherited the pieces without the Pattern, has been directed chiefly to study of the separate bits.

The original Pattern, however, was never lost to the consciousness of the Self-realized Ones. But for long ages they have had to work in secrecy and silence, dropping hints, like precious pearls, far and wide apart, into minds prepared to receive them. Such minds of larger vision have attempted synthesis and have found that certain facts dovetailed with others. Those who followed, using their findings, have carried further the reconstruction of a portion of the Plan. The work of none is independent of his predecessors' efforts, and so the credit for no achievement belongs wholly to one man.

This continuity of knowledge and this interlinking of effort and of thought afford most powerful proof of human unity. So the harmonious Pattern, still only dimly sensed but gradually re-emerging ever farther into public ken, bears its own evidence, beyond gainsaying, that the world is one. Science has discovered many parts and correlations of that Pattern since Isaac Newton's day. But each is still only a rediscovery, a restoration of the lines perceived how many ages since!

THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE

[THE FIRST PART of this long article by **Bhadanta Bhikshu Sangharakshita** of the Triyana Vardhana Vihara, Kalimpong, appeared in May. There he dealt with two of the four *viparyāsas* or mental "perversities." In this second part he deals with the other two — the tendencies to forget that all component things are subject to decay and that among them no untrammelled happiness is possible but pain must lurk near all pleasant experiences.—ED.]

II

"*Sabbe sankhārā anattā.*" From the impermanence of the conditioned to its insubstantiality is a short step; so much so that to penetrate at all deeply into the former is ultimately to find oneself in the midst of the latter. Like other doctrinal formulæ, that of the three marks is by no means best understood when understood most literally, and it would be well to remind ourselves that in it we have to deal, not with three distinct properties of the conditioned, but rather with so many ways of penetrating into its true nature.

One of the most convenient methods of making the transition from *anitya* to *anātman* is by considering the notion of change. We say, "The leaf changes from green to red." In terms of the traditional grammatical-cum-logical analysis this is a sentence-proposition predicating in a certain subject-substance the succeeding of one attribute by another. Such an analysis implies that in some sense it is possible for a substance to exist without its attributes — that a leaf can hang on a tree without being red or green or yellow or blue or any other colour. In *what sense* this is possible has not always been clear, though. Quite a number of philosophers have treated what is evidently a purely linguistic convention, useful enough as a means of facilitating the acquisition of a language, as a real distinction between things. An extraordinarily large number of philosophical and religious doctrines are in fact based on this fallacy, including the conception of God as Absolute Being (that is, as being abstracted from all particular existent things), of the individual as embodying an immortal soul or changeless self independent of the sum-total of psycho-physical states, the dogma of the Trinity (unity of Godhead or substance distinct from plurality of persons), and the dogma of Transubstantiation (change of the substances of bread and wine into the flesh and blood of Christ while their accidents remain unchanged). Other philosophers have sought to evade the obvious difficulties of real-

ism by maintaining that the distinction between a substance and its properties is conceptual, that it exists, but only in thought.

Buddhism, however, goes to the root of the matter and declares (as modern studies in the subject have established) that a phenomenon viewed dynamically is the totality of "its" conditions and viewed statically the totality of its parts, and that over and above these conditions and parts no phenomenon exists. Abstracted from its green and red colour a leaf is not an independent entity but only a name. When it changes its colour what really happens is that, as the traditional formula would have it, in dependence on a green leaf a red leaf arises. This does not mean that the green leaf and the red are discrete, much less still that one is the "cause" of the other, for the change from green to red is a continuous process. What it really means is that while the first *lakṣaṇa* affirms only that all conditioned things change, the second *lakṣaṇa,* penetrating far deeper, affirms that there is nothing which changes. To abstract the "thing" which is changed from the process of change itself and set it up as an independent entity upon which change impinges, as it were, from outside is fallacious.

The difference between *anitya* and *anātma* can also be expressed by saying that whereas according to the former the conditioned changes, according to the latter it *is* change — the implied distinction between subject and predicate, substance and attribute, being merely verbal. Further, since the change is continuous we are not to think of conditioned *dharmas* as entities lying as it were in a row side by side. They are in fact only so many sections marked off in the continuum of conditioned existence. In other words, the existence of the *dharmas* into which Buddhism resolves the so-called personality is in the final analysis as much nominal as that of the personality itself. This understanding receives explicit formulation in the doctrine of the twofold *nairātmya,* of *pudgalas* and of *dharmas,* advanced by the Mahāyāna to counteract the pluralistic realism of the Sarvāstivāda, an influential early Hīnayāna school, which, while agreeing that personality, as a congeries of conditioned *dharmas,* exists only nominally, maintained that the substance of these *dharmas* persists unchanged through the three periods of time. Such a position, as its critics saw, and as from the positiveness of their denials we may infer even the Sarvāstivādins felt, logically results in a species of substantialism. Occasional deviations of this kind apart, Buddhist thought as a whole adhered faithfully throughout the long course of its development to the strict nominalism inherent in its doctrine of

insubstantiality, for which reason it was able, not only to root out from the minds of its true followers the last vestige of attachment to self, but also to remain free from the sort of confusions which arise from the uncritical assumption that the structure of reality must conform to linguistic usage.

The meaning of *anātma* is by no means exhausted, however. As we have seen, not only the conditioned, but also the Unconditioned, is insubstantial. But in what does its insubstantiality consist? Conditioned things are *anātma* because they are no more than the totality of their constituent parts or functions and because, when they change, there is nothing which changes apart from the process of change itself. But the Unconditioned, the *asaṁskṛta* or uncompounded, is by definition impartite and unchanging. How, then, can it too be designated as *anātma*? On the face of it the term cannot be used in the same sense in both cases. The Unconditioned is *anātma* in the sense that it is *niḥsvabhāva* or devoid of determinate nature. It cannot be pointed out as this or that. All descriptions, such as that it is eternal and blissful, are true in the conventional sense only. In reality it is ineffable. Consequently it cannot be defined as existent, or as non-existent, or as both existent and non-existent, or even as neither existent nor non-existent. Carried to its logical conclusion, this means that it cannot be defined even as the Unconditioned, for such a definition limits it to being something other than the conditioned. Just as freedom, in order to be truly free, must liberate itself from the freedom that is opposed to bondage, so the Unconditioned, to be really such, must transcend the opposition between what is conditioned and what is not.

At this point the insubstantiality of the conditioned and the insubstantiality of the Unconditioned overlap. As we have already seen, the *dharmas* into which analysis resolves the so-called *pudgala* have themselves ultimately only a nominal, not a real, existence. Conditioned existence is in reality a pure continuum. The more deeply we fathom this continuum the more we realize that its true nature, too, is ineffable and that even as by penetrating into *anitya* we ultimately emerge in the midst of *anātman*, so by knowing the conditioned in its depth we know also the Unconditioned. Thus, although at the level at which the two orders are seen as different *anātma* is used in one sense for the conditioned and in another for the Unconditioned, at the level where this difference is seen to be nominal the two kinds of insubstantiality resolve themselves, on sufficiently deep analysis,

into a third, profounder kind. For *anātma* in this wider and deeper sense of the indescribable "thusness" (*tathatā*) which constitutes the ultimate reality of both conditioned and unconditioned *dharmas,* Mahāyāna thought generally appropriates the term *śūnyatā,* literally "Voidness." Nirvana, the fourth or supplementary *lakṣaṇa,* broadly coincides with the Unconditioned as cessation of the conditioned and hence as the goal of their aspiration for those to whom the surface of conditioned existence appears as permanent, pleasant and real.

"*Sabbe sankhārā dukkhā.*" Though all the characteristics present difficulties to those who seek to understand Buddhism from a point of view other than its own, it is with regard to the statement that all conditioned things are suffering — corresponding to the second *viparyāsa* and the first Āryan Truth — that they are apt to become most acute. On account of this characteristic do its critics complain that Buddhism is morbid, pessimistic, cynical, a lover of the shady side of the street, the enemy of harmless pleasures, an unfeeling trampler on the little innocent joys of life. At the same time they are confounded by the indisputable fact that the peoples of Buddhist lands seem happy; and often the more Buddhist the more happy. Some try to explain the anomaly as simply a case of Far Eastern cheerfulness breaking in through the Indian gloom of Buddhism; others dismiss it with irritation as a sheer perversity. In either case the critics remain uncomfortably aware of a plain contradiction between what they represent as the pessimistic principles of Buddhism and its optimistic practice. According to them, apparently, Buddhism being a pessimistic teaching, its followers ought always to look sad.

In reality Buddhism is neither pessimistic nor optimistic. If compelled to label it in this way at all we should borrow a word from George Eliot and call it melioristic; for though asserting that conditioned existence is suffering it also maintains, as the third Āryan Truth teaches, that suffering can be transcended. The mistake of the critics lies in assuming that according to Buddhism the conditioned is painful *under all circumstances and from all points of view.* Despite the loftiness of its thought, however, Buddhism is not so absurdly remote from ordinary human life as to deny that for the average man a glass of beer, an evening with his girl friend or a new motor car are pleasant things. What it does is to point out that life also contains a number of undeniably unpleasant things, which nobody would ever pretend were enjoyable, such as old age, disease, death, being separated from what we like

and associated with what we dislike. The latter make up the dark, painful side of existence which most of us do our best to ignore, and it is because we act in this ostrich-like fashion, not because, as sometimes alleged, it considers pain more real than pleasure, that Buddhism recommends various spiritual exercises which by bringing this dark side of life more prominently into view will give us a less one-sided picture of existence. Having done this, it goes a step farther and points out that the pleasant things and the painful things, the sweet and the bitter experiences of life, are interconnected, so that it is impossible to enjoy the one without having to suffer the other.

This is not to say merely that a glass of beer may result in a headache, a girl friend prove unfaithful or a ride in a new motor car end in a hospital, though of course all these things may happen. Pleasure and pain can be connected in much subtler ways than this. The repressed awareness that we are enjoying ourselves at someone else's expense, as nearly always is the case, gives rise to an unconscious sense of guilt that spoils the enjoyment. Pleasant things are tied up with worry and anxiety, because we are afraid of losing them. Enjoyable experiences, whether of body or mind, strengthen our attachment to the psychophysical personality that is the basis as much for suffering as for enjoyment. Moreover, pleasures differ not only in kind but in degree of intensity, and what was once pleasant may become less pleasant, or insipid, or even positively painful, in comparison with something more pleasant, or within the context of a wider range of experience. Vajrayāna tradition recognizes four stages of bliss: that arising from the senses (*ānanda*), from the *dhyānas* (*paramānanda*), from the attainment of Nirvana (*viramānanda*), and from the realization of the non-duality of the conditioned and the Unconditioned (*sahajānanda,* literally "congenital," *i.e.,* innate or natural bliss). On experiencing the bliss of a higher, one naturally loses interest in that of a lower, degree of intensity. Thus, although not maintaining the absurd thesis that all conditioned things are painful under all circumstances and from all points of view, Buddhism certainly does most vigorously maintain that no conditioned being can be pleasant under all circumstances and from all points of view.

It goes even farther than this. It maintains that even if one could carve out from the variegated web of life the bright parts of the pattern, leaving aside the dark, and assemble them into a single blaze of unmitigated brightness, the resultant experience would not even then be one

of unmixed enjoyment. In the depths of the heart there would remain a void which no conditioned thing, but only the Unconditioned, could fill. This profound truth is echoed at a lower, theistic level of thought by St. Augustine's famous apostrophe, "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless until they find rest in Thee." It is illustrated by Goethe's great and complex philosophical poem *Faust,* wherein the hero promises his soul to Mephistopheles if he can give him one permanently satisfying experience:—

> And heartily
> When thus I hail the Moment flying:
> "Ah still delay — thou art so fair!"
> Then bind me in thy bonds undying.
> My final ruin then declare.

Knowledge, love, wealth, power, fail to pass the test. Like Māra in the scriptures, Mephistopheles has at his disposal only conditioned things. The Unconditioned, which alone can satisfy the deepest longings of the human heart, is beyond his power, and Faust therefore never pronounces the word that would seal his doom. What the third *lakṣaṇa* really means is, in positive terms, that Nirvana alone is peace, and, negatively, that conditioned things are painful because we seek in them for that absolute bliss which only the Unconditioned can bestow and have, therefore, inevitably to experience disappointment and frustration.

To learn to see the conditioned as ugly, impermanent, insubstantial and painful, instead of as the opposite, is not, of course, the work of a day. It can be thus seen only by means of *prajñā* or wisdom, a purely transcendental faculty that does not spring into existence all at once or by accident, but which has to be systematically nurtured, cultivated and developed on the twofold basis of an ethical life expressive of healthy mental attitudes, and a purified, concentrated and meditative consciousness. These categories, the first and second of which are covered by the terms *śīla* and *samādhi* respectively, together constitute the three great stages underlying all more detailed subdivisions of the Path of Enlightenment.

BHIKSHU SANGHARAKSHITA

SRADDHA AND JNANA

THE RELATION OF FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

[**Mr. Frank Fowler Conlon** is a graduate student and a member of the Department of History in the University of Minnesota, U.S.A. He offers a thoughtful commentary on the teaching of the *Gita* verses that appear at the head of his article. Faith is a mighty engine, of which we lose the benefit if we think of it as a resistance to reason in the sphere of reason. Mr Conlon emphasizes its place in bringing into action that perception which belongs to Man as an integrated being, not any one of his faculties.—ED.]

> The man of faith gets knowledge
> Intent solely upon it, restraining his senses.
> Having got knowledge, to supreme peace
> In no long time he goes.
>
> The man unknowing and without faith,
> His soul full of doubt, perishes.
> Not is this world, nor the next,
> Nor bliss, for him whose soul is full of doubt.[1]

IN the fourth chapter of the *Bhagavad-Gītā,* entitled "Discipline of Knowledge," the above passage offers the vital key to the proper understanding of the means by which a man may fully realize the potential powers of knowledge or *jñāna* in attaining the ultimate goal of complete freedom. The relation of *śraddhā* to *jñāna,* that relation of faith to knowledge, has continual significance in the understanding of the true message of the *Gītā.* Yet often it would appear that the nature of this relationship is obscured in inaccurate translations or interpretations. I have attempted to suggest an interpretation of the above passage which will agree with the total context of the *Gītā.*

The modern reader, especially in America, may receive an inaccurate view of the nature of the passage in several translations. For example, Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's version as it appears in *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* begins: "He who has faith, who is absorbed in it. . . ."[2] This suggests initially an idea that Radhakrishnan states elsewhere: "We must have a positive basis for life, and unwavering faith

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[1] FRANKLIN EDGERTON (trs.): *The Bhagavad-Gita,* Chapter IV, verses 39-40; Part I (Vol. 38 in "Harvard Oriental Series," Cambridge, Mass., 1944), p. 51.

[2] SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN and CHARLES A. MOORE: *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* (Princeton, N. J., 1957), p. 119.

which stands the test of life."[3] It is important to realize that within the *Gītā* faith, in itself, is not the end man should seek. Nor is faith merely a tool or mental trick which, by improving the individual's attitude, and thereby his social personality, will create a more pleasant atmosphere in his day-to-day life.

Rather, faith must be understood to be a necessary means to the greater realization of *jñāna* (knowledge), which is one of what Aurobindo has called "the two wings of the soul's ascent" towards complete freedom. Vinoba Bhave suggests the true nature of faith in his discussion of *karma-yoga*:—

> Action is . . . the wick of the lamp of knowledge. . . . When the inner feeling goes with the action, the latter is transformed into something unique. When the flame is applied to the wick in the oil, light is born.[4]

This inner feeling, this flame, is faith — a force that is absolutely necessary for the adequate grasping of the knowledge which may bring the individual closer to the goal of *mokṣa*. We must never forget that the knowledge the *Gītā* would have us seek is not just a product of human intellectual exercise, but is far above and beyond that range, transcending individuality and possessing a quality of the infinite. "*Jñāna* as wisdom is free from doubts while (in) intellectual knowledge where we depend on sense data and logical inference, doubt (and) scepticism have their place."[5] Aurobindo suggests that *jñāna*

> is the light by which we grow into our true being, not the knowledge by which we increase our information and our intellectual riches; it is not scientific or psychological or ethical or æsthetic or worldly and practical knowledge. These, too, no doubt help us to grow, but only in the becoming, not in the being; they enter into the definition of Yogic knowledge only when we use them as aids to know the Supreme, the Self, the Divine. . . .[6]

The faith necessary for gaining wisdom and true knowledge is not a blind belief, but rather lies within the aspirations of the soul to gain the highest wisdom. Without the realization that this faith is tied both to ritual and to the perfection of attitude, we cannot begin to comprehend the necessity for completely giving up one's self to the pursuit of the higher forms of knowledge which will lead eventually to complete

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[3] SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN: *The Bhagavadgita* (New York, n.d.), p. 172.

[4] ACHARYA VINOBA BHAVE: *Talks on the Gita* (New York, 1960), p. 53.

[5] RADHAKRISHNAN: *The Bhagavadgita*, pp. 171-172.

[6] SRI AUROBINDO: *Essays on the Gita* (New York, 1960), p. 182.

freedom. Thus, the "man unknowing and without faith" may indeed perish and not attain the ultimate goal, the bliss of *mokṣa*, the bliss of freedom, either in this world or the next. The doubter perishes for his lack of faith. While doubt and scepticism have definite values in the lower orders of worldly intellectual knowledge, still they are transitory in nature, and are seen in the *Gitā* as stumbling blocks and obstructions. For in higher knowledge perhaps the vital kernel of the *jñāna* is not a balancing and weighing of truth and error, but rather is a constantly progressing realization of the revealed truth. In intellectual knowledge there always appears "a mixture of falsehood and incompleteness" which has to be removed by "subjecting the truth itself to sceptical inquiry." In the higher realm, however, falsehood by definition will not enter, and

> that which intellect contributes by attaching itself to this or that opinion cannot be got rid of by mere questioning, but will fall away of itself by persistence in realization.[7]

Whatever inconsistencies appear to the individual's mind may be explained not by questioning the basic roots of that knowledge which has already been attained, that is to say, revealed, but rather by accepting the revealed knowledge and proceeding further, full of faith, toward a more complete and satisfying realization, "through a deeper, higher and wider living within the Spirit."

This is not a process akin to empirical problem-solving — there is no puzzle or riddle which will be dispatched by a quick and clever answer. The realization of such potent knowledge is a complex and necessarily lengthy process for most men — perhaps even spanning more than one lifetime. Certainly the fundamental *śraddhā* or faith must be held in patience and devotion, for *jñāna* cannot be acquired merely through the exercise of the intellect. In fact, it might even stand in opposition to ideas and concepts in which "reason" and logic become entangled. The *jñāna* which must be sought with faith is not a truth that is to be proven empirically, but instead must be lived inwardly. The truth must encompass the individual in all things — a greater reality into which the individual must grow.

The "man unknowing and without faith" cannot really attain a truly satisfactory role, even in this life, for nothing of a decisive nature may be achieved in this world — even on the most prosaic levels, and certainly not in the realm of progress toward the realization of complete

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 183.

freedom for the soul — without faith. "The merely sceptical mind loses itself in the void."[8]

Why is this all-pervading faith necessary for the true and complete comprehension of *jñāna*? It lies within the very nature of *jñāna* and creates the definitive outlines of *śraddhā*. For *jñāna* has such potentials that Krishna can tell Arjuna that even if he be the worst of all sinners, "merely by the boat of knowledge all (the 'sea' of) evil shall thou cross over."[9] The scope of *jñāna* is actually beyond the pale of empirically testable definition.

> It is in itself a self-existent truth and would be self-evident if it were not for the sorceries of ignorance in which we live; the doubts, the perplexities which prevent us from accepting it and following it, arise from that ignorance, from that sense-bewildered, opinion-perplexed heart and mind, living as they do in a lower and phenomenal truth and therefore questioning the higher realities.[10]

The means to an adequate realization of the truth of *jñāna* must arise from something which is vitally a part of man's greatest potentials, the "inner feeling," the flame of faith.

FRANK FOWLER CONLON

THE MIND'S WINDOW

Sometimes a mist
Or torrential rain
Obscures the view
Beyond your pane.

Shut in by walls
Of selfhood, I
Yearn for expanse
Of earth and sky.

Then, gradually,
Oh, blessed sight!
Your pane grows clear,
Lets in the light.

HERBERT BLUEN

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[8] *Ibid.*

[9] EDGERTON (trs.): *The Bhagavad-Gita*, Chapter IV, verse 36, p. 51.

[10] SRI AUROBINDO: *Essays on the Gita*, p. 183.

THE RIGHT ATTITUDE

[**Dr. Indra Chandra Shastri, M.A., Ph.D.,** has already contributed more than one scholarly article to our pages. In this one he describes that inner attitude which is necessary to a spiritual aspirant, and he does so using mainly the exhaustive Jain classifications on the subject.—Ed.]

Right attitude (*Samyak Darshan*) is the first and foremost qualification of an aspirant. Whether the aim is mundane or supermundane, the goal material or spiritual, it is important as a requisite of success. Every system of religion has prescribed it as the starting point of the spiritual journey. It consists in the right selection of, first, the ideal; secondly, the preceptor, one who can show the way in both theory and practice; and, thirdly, the way itself. In the solutions of political, social and other problems also it holds an important function.

The Vedanta prescribes the following four requisites for an aspirant:

1. Perception of the distinction between what is permanent and what is temporary. In the field of valuation, this is the distinguishing of permanent values from temporary ones.

2. Detachment from all objects of the temporary values, attainable in this world or in the next.

3. A calm temperament, undisturbed by external effects, which consists of: (i) mental equilibrium, (ii) control of sensual desires, (iii) being unaffected by external inducements, (iv) tolerance and fortitude in hardship, (v) concentration and (vi) faith or devotion.

4. A desire for release (*mukti*).

Of actions, Vedic tradition mentions three types:

1. The actions to be performed as daily or occasional duties, such as daily prayers or purificatory baths to be taken on certain occasions. These acts do not yield any positive result but neglect or non-performance of them is a sin. They protect the person from the accumulation of new "dirt" obscuring the spiritual qualities.

2. Acts performed with a particular motive, such as the sacrifices performed for obtaining kingdom, wealth, progeny, etc.

3. Acts prohibited by the scriptures, which bring sin to the doer.

The aspirant is required to give up the last two types and continue the first for long. Gradually his heart will be purified and he will have an inclination towards higher values. His aim will shift from the temporary to the permanent.

Patanjali compares the mind to a river having a shifting current.

Sometimes the current is directed towards lower values and sometimes towards the higher values. There are five states of mind, of which the first three express the lower tendency and the remaining two the higher. The first three are: (1) the state of engrossment in external objects; (2) the state of ignorance or obscurity; and (3) the state of fluctuation when the mind is unsteady, inclining sometimes inward and sometimes outward.

The two higher states are: (1) the state of concentration and (2) the state of control when the mind is absolutely free from thought.

Buddhism describes the two groups of states as respectively that of a layman (*puhujana*) and that of one who has entered the current of higher values (*sotapanna*).

In Jainism the right attitude has been described elaborately. Its constituents, causes, perversions and other things have been discussed in detail. This is useful to an ordinary aspirant also. According to Jainism, the right attitude has two aspects — the internal and the external. The internal aspect is related to the requisite purification of soul.

The soul is compared to a traveller wandering in the forest who has lost his way. Sometimes he is far from the path and sometimes comes near and enters its borders without realizing it. In spite of a physical contact with the path he is not conscious of it; consequently the next moment he loses it and goes astray. Perchance it happens that when he enters the border through the instruction of a preceptor or the direction of his inner voice he comes to recognize the path. This is quite a new incident in his career. Jainism analyzes this process into three "feats." The first is "the accidental feat" (*Yathāpravratikaran*), *i.e.*, touching the path accidentally without consciousness of it. The second is "the novel feat" (*apurvakaran*), one which was never experienced before. The third is "the feat of non-return" (*anivratikaran*), when the aspirant is fixed on the path and cannot be misled.

This is possible only when the *karmas* or the matter polluting the soul are reduced to within a reasonable limit. This pollution is known as *moha,* illusion, or perversion, which is again divided into two, *viz.*, perversion in attitude and perversion in conduct. The latter is elaborated into four types of passions: anger, conceit, crookedness and greed. Only when the effect of the two types of *moha* is reduced to below a certain maximum, and the inner light of the soul therefore begins to pierce it with its rays, does the right attitude dawn.

The external form of right attitude consists in three "adoptions":

of a right ideal; of a right preceptor and of the right path. In Jainism the ideal is represented by the perfect soul free from the obscuring, debasing or weakening pollutions. This ideal is personified by the *Arihanta, i.e.,* the perfected soul in physical existence, and the *Siddha, i.e.,* the same out of physical existence. The right preceptor is not only cognizant of the way but is a traveller on it who has renounced all other ambitions and activities and made this journey the sole aim of his life. He voluntarily imposes on himself all the disciplines, restrictions and rigours required for progress in that journey. The path is that taught by the perfected souls, those perfect in knowledge and perfectly free from attachment and hatred or other passions.

Though Jainism also deteriorated later into a sect and the above three constituents of right attitude were identified with particular personal beings, in the beginning they were stated in a form absolutely free from that bias. Pure Jainism is the worship of pure principles, unalloyed and unbiased. The Jain hymn of salutation recited at the beginning of every auspicious undertaking is free from any personal name. Out of the five salutations mentioned in it the first two go to perfected souls and the remaining three to the followers in that journey in their different functions.

The effect or creative power of the right attitude varies according to the strength of faith and detachment from lower values. Three types of faith are distinguished according to their comparative creativity.

1. Creative (*kārak*). The faith or attitude which impels a person to action. Action is the standard by which to judge the strength of belief. If we sincerely believe in an idea, we must act accordingly; otherwise we lack in belief.

2. Appreciative (*rochak*). The inclination towards a noble object to the extent of mere commendation. The person with this type of faith tries to induce others to act and puts the proposal forward in an attractive manner, but he himself is not impelled to act. We might compare him with an artist who can move the audience with music, dance, dramatic acting or some other performance full of pathos but who is unmoved himself. Much modern leadership can be thus classed.

3. Illuminative (*dipak*). A lamp shows the path to others but itself does not get any profit. Similarly, a person who can explain the subtleties of the spiritual path to others, who helps others in the journey by illuminating the path, without moving himself, belongs to this type. It is mere scholarship without life.

There are five perversions of attitude obstructing the way to righteousness. As a matter of fact, they are mental weaknesses.

1. The perversion of attaching secondary importance to righteousness (*ābhigrāhic*). Many persons adopt the path of righteousness for some other ulterior motive. To adopt a principle to please an influential person, for wealth, for fame or for any other motive except the principle in itself is a perversion of this category. Religious systems have adopted the method of inducement in their propagation. They pointed out the future pleasures of heaven and this world as the result of their renunciation in this life. The person was promised hundreds of beautiful damsels as the result of celibacy in this life. A drunkard was promised a heaven where fountains of wine are flowing. These inducements divert the attention of the aspirant from the supreme values to lower desires. Similarly to adopt political life not as a career of service to the nation but with a view to occupying chairs, gathering influence or with some other ulterior motive is a perversion of this type.

3. The perversion of egotism (*abhiniveshic*). To follow a path merely to satisfy an egoistic temperament. A person knows that the path adopted by him is wrong. Yet he sticks to it because any change hurts his sense of pride. This perversion is common among religious preachers in high positions who continue the same preaching even after ceasing to believe its truth. It requires great courage to correct oneself, particularly in an esteemed position after the accumulation of fame and popularity. It is really a tragedy that the person, though aware of his mistake, is not allowed to correct himself. This is why the seeker of truth is enjoined to run away from fame or other egoistic fascinations.

4. The perversion of doubt (*sāṁshayic*). To be continually doubtful in mind, without resolution or determination leading to action. The progress of a person with this perversion is hampered by fluctuations. He does not gather enough force to rise to his feet and move.

5. The perversion of undeveloped consciousness (*anābhog*). This is found among the animals, who are devoid of any consciousness of lower or higher values, creatures of instinct.

Jainism holds further that knowledge without a right attitude is a perverted knowledge and conduct without it is a perverted conduct. Knowledge is no doubt a power which can be used for a good as well as a bad purpose. When the object is bad, the power or instrument leading to its attainment also comes in the same class. Similarly if a power is used for a good purpose, it becomes good. Power in the hands of a devil

is known as *āsurī shakti* (devilish power) and the same in the hands of a god becomes divine (*daivī shakti*). Thus the perversion or purity of knowledge is not intrinsic but pragmatically determined, according to the attitude of the knower. The same rule applies in the case of conduct also. Thus attitude is the main standard of valuation. A person with the right attitude but devoid of knowledge and conduct shall get them in due course, but the person far advanced in knowledge and conduct but with perverted attitude may or may not reach the right attitude. In other words, sincerity of purpose, purity of aim and a sense of correct valuation are the foundation of individual as well as national character. Any nation without this sincerity may express its religiosity in high-sounding terms but cannot make any real progress. A religious preacher may possess a beautiful art of expression but cannot purify himself without this sincerity. And scholarship without it is merely a tormenting of words.

I. C. Shastri

PERENNIAL MUTINEER

The infinite precision of the mind of God
The prismed luminosity — the plumb-lined depths —
The ape, the atom, and the diametric spheres
Pin-pointed in the All-Pervasive-Consciousness;
And frustrate man, perennially the mutineer,
Strutting his insignificance — straining to usurp —
Reducing the immeasurables to his dimension —
A barbed-wire fence and neon sign for every sun —
His blare and glare blot out alike bird song and stars.

Dorothy Ellin Flax

FROM RELIGION TO HUMANISM

[**Shri Noshir Bilpodiwala** is a young Field Officer in the Life Insurance Corporation of India at Poona. He finds the human side of his job profoundly interesting and has no regrets at having taken it up at an early age. He is also drawn to the Sarvodaya aspect of Gandhian thought and influenced by Acharya Vinoba Bhave. He contributes frequently to *Bhoodan, Mira* and other journals.

This essay is interesting for its fresh feeling and plain speaking. Shri Bilpodiwala's "humanism" is, of course, simply a concern for human good irrespective of separative dogmas and extra-cosmic deities. He does not commit himself to the exact doctrines of the movement academically known as "humanism." He is profoundly right, in any case, in criticizing religious creeds for becoming theologies as opposed to philanthropy.—ED.]

THERE is a pretty little parable about a certain Guru and his two disciples who massaged his legs every night. After some years, a record of rights was established and one disciple took charge of the left leg; the other of the right. These legs now no more remained the Guru's; they became the sole monopolies of the two disciples. The legs were always referred to as the property of one of the disciples. One night, while massaging their "respective legs," the two disciples quarrelled over a petty matter. Hot words were exchanged and they came to blows. But these disciples were very brave. They did not hit each other. Instead the leftist took the rightist's leg, and gave it a sound thrashing. The other fanatic could not stand this insult; so he took the Guru's left leg and started beating it, saying: "here you so-and-so, tit for tat!" The poor Guru (who was sleeping) woke up with a start and then the disciples realized that they were hurting the Guru who had nothing to do with their petty quarrel.

This is, very likely, a fairy-tale and we need not believe it; but our religious fanatics are very much like these devout disciples. The Zoroastrian community is a small one, but its religious zeal is great. The missionaries din into our ears: "Christ is the only way! There is no salvation except through Him!" Some Christians, in fact, are more catholic than the Pope. Muslims are much the same. There are, of course, broad-minded exceptions, but, on the whole, religions have become chaos incorporated!

Teachings are forgotten; Prophets have become important. In their zeal and fanaticism people have forgotten that the Prophets were mere

signposts who showed the way. They stick to these signposts and worship them, instead of forging ahead on the beautiful paths that are shown. This is how every religion of the past has degenerated into dogmatism. It has been made essentially a theology, not philanthropy. It has more to do with ceremonies, temple-going, praying and several other superfluities. It is governed by superstitions which have nothing to do with right thinking. It has come to be indissolubly connected with a belief in the existence of a God. Superstitions and religions have usually gone hand in hand. But the impulse to participate in the struggle for human improvement is not dependent, as many instances indicate, on whether a man believes in the existence of a God or not.

Acharya Vinoba Bhave says: "Religion and Politics are out of vogue . . . these are the days of Science and Spirituality." Religion and politics, the two monsters, have been the main sources of conflict; religion, perhaps, more of the two! It has been maintained that "a man without religion is like a ship without a mast." Like many other proverbs this one has proved to be both faulty and dangerous. If there were only ONE religion on this earth, such a saying would have had its value, but we have been having so many "masts" and trying to break one another's, that the ship has begun to sink.

Once a person acquires a scientific attitude, dogma begins to melt like a piece of ice melting in the sun. The scientific attitude reverses the order of thought channels and introduces men to the rare process called "thinking." It is indeed a wonderful experience, for in this attitude, FACTS come first; then one employs his reason to draw inferences from facts. If there are no facts, there can be no useful concepts. The dogmatist on the other hand uses his reason to select or torture the facts in support of his ideology. Dogma comes first; facts afterwards.

Search after Truth, important though it be, is not the whole aim and end of life. The truth is not a mummified corpse to be placed in a museum when found, to be labelled, classified, catalogued and left in the holy books, dry and sterile. This is just what happened to the teachings of most of our religions and Prophets. Truth is something vital, which has to take root in men's hearts and bear fruits in their lives, before they reap the full reward of their search. An instinct, born out of the necessities of living in a world full of uncompromising soul searchers, tells us to beware of the citizens who go about with blueprints of THE TRUTH in their pockets.

It would, I should think, be in keeping with reality if religions

were to concentrate our powers upon that which is within our reach to do; and that is to make this world, with its tremendous potentialities for beauty and happiness, a place in which *every* man, woman and child will truly be able to say: "We are grateful that we live, for Life indeed is good."

There have been many superstitions connected with religion in the past as well as in the present. Many, for instance, have tried to prove, by means of a chain of reasoning concocted out of the Old Testament, not only that the rich nonconformist merchants were thoroughly virtuous but also that workers, peasants and, in general, all the poor were thoroughly vicious and so deserved the miseries they suffered. "The surprising thing about the industrial revolution," as Aldous Huxley says, "is not the bad behaviour of the entrepreneurs, but that they were so serenely convinced of their perfect goodness." This, one might say, was in the past; but let us take our sense of values at present. Ours is a society which honours the mill-owner growing on sweated labour but which is horrified by sexual impropriety. Our lopsided morality is such that a man might grind the faces of the poor under all sorts of pretensions; but so long as he leaves alone his neighbour's wife and daughter he is regarded as virtuous. This is not written to justify or advocate promiscuity. I am only emphasizing the fact that the exploiter is as immoral as the "sexploiter" and must be regarded as such.

> Every human life is a unique adventure [writes Sir Arthur Keith]! And if our stock of beliefs depends on the early pilgrimage we make, then there must be as many shades of beliefs as there are human beings.

As long as Man remains an enquiring animal there can never be a complete unanimity in our fundamental beliefs. Most men and women take the way in Life which happens to be open to them. They have neither the leisure nor the inclination to mark and digest the experiences which come their way. Only a few are free to select their paths and choose those which yield the richest harvest of experience. No creed is final. Every creed must grow and change as knowledge grows and changes.

The scientific attitude is not restricted to scientists only. It is now taken even by broad-minded theologians who have the truthfulness to see the wrongdoings of Religion. Dr. S. H. Miller, Dean of the Harvard Divinity School, for example, says:—

> If religion is to have any real place in the modern world, it will have

to undergo a radical revolution. The only religion that counts is one which is radical enough to engage in the world's basic troubles. If it cannot do that, then it can do nothing to merit God's concern or the world's respect. (Quoted from *Sarvodayanagar*, July 1961)

It is a welcome sign to see that the younger generation is not inclined to accept any religion in the old groove of thought. Reason demands that we now follow just One Religion — and that is the religion of humanism.

NOSHIR BILPODIWALA

LINEN AND INKHORN THE WRITER

Testing words against the teeth of experience
Turning them within his mouth
His tongue tastes afresh his language
Made young with new meaning.
He lisps with wonder speech which lends
His lips the sweetness of sense released.
By the delicate embroidery of ink,
The silken thread of thought,
He articulates the wholeness of the page;
Uniting in the beauty of pattern,
Plain cloth and intricate desire
He works the miracle of metamorphosis.
Relations are created and cherished
With words. Words are presences.
They witness what we signify. We
Keep the words of those we care for:
What we are to each other
Is the import of all speech.
The word is recognition; the word is realization.
Words assess. The way of the word
Is beyond our comprehension.
It wears away the fetters of spirit.
The spoken word brings song to birth:
The written word can wait and work.
Skies fill with light, fields brim with grain,
Lakes rise with water. Light spills
From skies, grain bursts from fields.
Waters overflow. Language,
Welling on the lips of living men,
Issues from the inkhorn of linened scribes.

LILA RAY

JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

[**Shri Shamsuddin, M.A., B.T., M.Ed.,** is particularly interested in the problems of education and has contributed essays on the subject to several periodicals. His simplified outline of John Dewey's theory of education will be of interest especially to the layman. As a metaphysic, pragmatism has limitations that have been widely debated; but it is beyond doubt that Dewey's respect for the child as a learner and his firm grasp of the necessary relation between educational conditions and social reality are virtues needed in any system, to whatever more transcendent wisdom it hopes to open a path for its pupils.—ED.]

AMONG those responsible for shaping the system of American education, two names stand foremost. They are John Dewey and Horace Mann. Neither of them, single-handed, altered the educational scene. Together, they formulated some of the major philosophical concepts which underlie the whole system of education in America. In fact Horace Mann, a lawyer who later turned educator, laid the foundation upon which John Dewey erected the structure of the system of education.

John Dewey, whose books have been published in many lands and languages, is essentially a pragmatist and an experimentalist. He is extremely practical in thinking and is mainly concerned with practical success in life. He defined the educational process as one of continuous growth, and said:—

> Infancy, youth, adult life — all stand on the same educative level in the sense that what is really learned at any and every stage of experience constitutes the value of the experience and in the sense that it is the chief business of life at every point to make living thus contribute to an enrichment of its own perceptible meaning. . . .

Regarding the purposes of education he further said:—

> Government, business, art, religion, all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That purpose is to set free and develop the capacities of human individuals without respect to race, sex, class economic status. And this is one with saying that the test of their value is the extent to which they educate every individual into the full stature of his responsibility. Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-round growth of every member of society.

To John Dewey, philosophy is not merely a passive contemplation but something which helps to solve the problems of life. To him "Truth" or "Reality" is not abstract but something closely related to man and his life in social environment. It works in life and satisfies man's wants. In his opinion, there are no absolute moral principles or fixed values of life. Being created by men, they go on changing. Man thus becomes the experimenter and the creator of values. To do this successfully it is necessary that the individual should develop himself fully, not as a solitary self but as a social being. Dewey has also deep faith in democracy, which implies co-operative activity, group relationships and equal opportunities for all.

John Dewey defines education as "the development of all those capacities in the individual which enable him to control his environment and fulfil his possibilities." For him education means the realization of practical ends. He lays stress on two important aspects of education — one the psychological and another the sociological aspect. The first is concerned with the child, the study of his nature, interests and activities, and the second is concerned with the study of the social conditions in which the child's powers are interpreted. Thus Dewey emphasizes the study of the child through a social medium as he has to live in and for the society and his powers can be fully developed only in society.

Considering the aims of education, Dewey says that they cannot be decided beforehand and are not fixed in advance. They will differ from child to child. Education tends to make the life of the child richer and fuller. Thus Dewey claims education to be part of life itself and not merely a preparation for life.

Regarding the functions of education Dewey says that it fills the gap between the innate nature of the child and the social standards of life according to which he has to live. The main function of education therefore is to enable the child to live a socially desirable life. At first an attempt is made to study the innate impulses of the child and then after proper direction and guidance they are sublimated for the socially desirable life of the child. Thus the child learns to control his innate impulses as well as his environments, to form proper habits useful for life in society. In this way education takes the form of a process of continuous growth. This growth is from within the child and not imposed from above. The teacher only helps and facilitates the process. Dewey emphasizes one thing more, and that is the constant reorganization of human experiences according to the needs and demands of the changing

society and world. The ever growing personality of the child selects and reorganizes his ideals according to the needs of the time.

In Dewey's philosophy of education a school is not merely a place for imparting instruction to the child but something more important than this. It has to take the form of a social institution to help the child to grow social consciousness by its co-operative living. The training which the child gets at home is further enlarged and developed in school in a more scientific way and with better equipment. Thus the school is in continuity with the home and the family. The school has to plan its work in such a way as to create a social environment to afford social experience to the children. In this way the school also helps the society to attain its aims of modern life and progress. As regards the teacher's place in Dewey's scheme of education, it can be said that he is not prominent but still he is important in the whole process of education. He is not to thrust his personality and his ideals of life on the child but to maintain such a social order and create such an environment as to give natural guidance to the child's experiences.

In Dewey's scheme of education the curriculum is not something to be fixed in advance and rigidly forced into the children's brains. It is very informal and changes according to the needs and interests of the children. It reflects the social life and activities of the child and takes the form of conversation and communication, inquiry, construction and beautiful expression. Stress is laid not only on the intellectual side of the child but on the development of his whole personality. Knowledge is imparted not for its own sake but for the sake of the child's better life in society. The child is made to learn critical thinking and ability to reason out things. The subjects are not taught separately, independently of each other, but as closely correlated with each other in a whole knowledge.

As regards teaching method, Dewey replaces the word "teaching" by "learning." He believes in the activities of the child and his gaining of experiences for himself rather than in books and exposition by teachers. He lays greater emphasis on self-education, play and creative activities resulting in self-government and self-discipline. Co-operative living and group activities of children in Dewey's school of education help them to inculcate proper habits, interests, aptitudes and morals in themselves. Dewey's approach finds its best expression in the Project Method, which lays stress on the child's purposeful activity and learning for himself.

Dewey has also great faith in the principles of democracy. He says

that "every individual should have a share in determining the conditions and aims of his own work." He also advocates full freedom to the teacher in the organization and administration of the school and the methods of teaching. He desires that there should be free communication between the teachers and the parents through conferences and meetings. They should have free discussions and help each other in solving the common problems of the children.

In short John Dewey has advocated a philosophy of education which is needed today. The child is to develop into a self-directing personality, strengthening his powers to shoulder greater responsibilities of life in future. The pragmatic outlook of Dewey, if adopted intelligently, will really go a long way in realizing the real aims of education in the present-day world.

SHAMSUDDIN

A proper and sane system of education should produce the most vigorous and liberal mind, strictly trained in logical and accurate thought, and not in blind faith.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY

ROBINSON CRUSOE AND HIS PROTOTYPE

REFLECTIONS ON FICTION AND REALITY

[WE ARE GLAD to welcome again after some time an old and esteemed contributor, **Mr. R. L. Megroz.** His examination of the similarities and differences between Alexander Selkirk and Crusoe and his comments on the element of "unacknowledged fiction" in even biography and history are of much interest.—ED.]

WHAT is the difference between a "character" in fiction and a "real" person known to us, in actual life or as having actually lived in the past? This question is not easily answered. At least it proved difficult to me when articles and lectures were commemorating the tercentenary of the birth of Daniel Defoe (1660-1731).

To the literary historian Defoe is important as the influential first real journalist and first true novelist in English literature; he was also a perceptive and constructive forecaster of a more civilized society. But Defoe's fame is more widely based than these great achievements could account for. He became world-famous eventually for his romance about the "strange surprising adventures" of Robinson Crusoe.

His story of a castaway on a deserted island had precursors and was to have successors. I do not refer to mere imitations inspired by the popular success of *Robinson Crusoe,* success which led Defoe himself to follow up the original book with increasingly dull additions, full of piously Puritan moralizing. The solitary castaway story, involving some degree of religious allegory, was probably known first in the Orient, not improbably in India or the East Indies. A later version was the twelfth-century tale of Hayy ibn Yaqzan (Alive, Son of Awake), who grew up alone on his island and somehow acquired the highest degree of knowledge and wisdom. The tale was written by a Muslim scholar, Ibn Tufail, famous Wazir at the Court of the Caliph in Marrakeesh. An English translation appeared in 1708. Defoe might well have read this example of the parables about man in solitude and it would have encouraged his tendency to moralize.

But another book undoubtedly triggered off in his professional writer's mind the idea of the "strange, surprising" adventures of a Robinson Crusoe. Defoe was fond of reading the literature of sailors' voyages to strange regions, and he would naturally have been interested in *A Cruising Voyage Round the World* by Captain Woodes Rogers, published in 1712; for this book became a more than nine days' wonder be-

cause of the true account in it of a Scots seaman rescued by Woodes Rogers' privateering expedition against the Spaniards in "the South Seas." The seaman, Alexander Selkirk, himself became a celebrity in London, when his commander introduced him to people like Richard Steele, the essayist.

Woodes Rogers questioned Selkirk when he had been taken off the island of Juan Fernandez (now called Mas-a-Tierra, in the Juan Fernandez group) 360 miles west of the Chile coast. He records the astonishment of the reconnoitring party when they saw the castaway on the beach — a "man cloth'd in Goat-Skins, who look'd wilder than the first owners of them."

Practically all the factual account of Selkirk's solitary life on his island reads like an original sketch for the "adventure" element in Robinson Crusoe; but the differences are usually significant. Defoe could freely invent and make his invention plausible, even convincing, by his perfectly suited prose style, even when he was ignoring probable or certain truth. An example of this is in Robinson Crusoe's loquacity after twenty-eight years on his island, the later years being with his faithful black Man Friday, who had to listen to the sermons. Woodes Rogers's observation on talking to Alexander Selkirk was that after being on his island alone for only four years and four months he was apparently losing the ability to speak properly.

Again, we are reminded of Crusoe when we read Woodes Rogers's report that Selkirk, on being marooned,

> had with him his Clothes and Bedding, with a Fire-lock, some Powder, Bullets, and Tobacco, a Hatchet, a Knife, a Kettle, a Bible, some practical Pieces, and his Mathematical Instruments and Books.[1] He diverted and provided for himself as well as he could; but for the first eight months had much ado to bear up against Melancholy, and the Terror of being left alone in such a desolate place.

But Defoe was all set to make the reader revel in a feast of acquisitiveness. Robinson Crusoe is the virtuous capitalist, as often imagined by his creator in more critical contexts, though what is meant by capitalism was only just developing, as if waiting for the start of the industrial revolution half a century later.

So Crusoe, unlike Selkirk, is not confined at the beginning of his solitude to a few personal belongings. Crusoe, for the trouble of collect-

[1] He was a qualified Sailing-Master.—R.L.M.

ing and fetching them from the convenient wrecked ship, has a pretty comprehensive range of goods, from food to tools and timber. One is strongly reminded of Defoe's real interest in trade, markets, shops and mercantile shipping as one rereads his hero's industrious collection of useful things.

Of course both Crusoe and Selkirk have to do some manual work, especially to secure good shelter, but later on Crusoe becomes something of a farmer, and his good use of some grain to grow increasing supplies is a typical Defoe story of industry and thrift.

The real man, Selkirk, reared in the industrious little fishing port of Largo, on the north coast of the Firth of Forth, where a local industry was getting salt from sea-water, complained of how badly for a long while he missed salt on his island, where both fish and goats were obtainable. He never attempted to make salt from the sea. While still despondent he made use of the ramshackle shelter that had been made years before by an American Indian who had also been left alone on the island.

Where it closely and obviously concerned his comfort and health, Selkirk could take trouble, but never more than was essential. When his boots were quite finished, though his father was a shoemaker and cobbler, he made no attempt to make any substitute footwear but went bare-footed. On his temperate island this was a help to his agility, which was such as to cause his rescuers astonishment. The wild goats (descended from domesticated animals left by previous visitors) frequented the high and rocky part of the island, but Selkirk, having used up all his gunpowder, soon was able to catch a goat with his hands and carry it down to his hut.

Being bare-footed was no doubt to Selkirk an almost pleasant reminder of childhood, but when he was picked up Rogers recorded that

> when his Clothes wore out, he made himself a Coat and Cap of Goat-Skins, which he stitch'd together with little Thongs of the same, that he cut with his Knife. He had no other Needle but a Nail; and when his Knife was wore to the back, he made others as well as he could of some Iron Hoops that were left ashore, which he beat thin and ground upon Stones. Having some Linen Cloth by him he sow'd himself Shirts with a Nail, and stitch'd 'em with the worsted of his old Stockings, which he pull'd out on purpose. He had his last Shirt on when we found him on the Island.

No less important were Selkirk's taming of some kids and rearing

domesticated goats, so that he had milk as well as flesh. Cats and rats brought to the island by other ships had increased greatly, and the rats quickly became a pest around and in his huts (he had eventually built a new one). So he tamed some of the cats also, and they kept the rats away. He enhanced the feeling of having company by singing and talking, and even pretending to dance with them.

The full story of Alexander Selkirk not only reveals him as a more interesting person than Robinson Crusoe but also includes dramatic experiences after his return home and receipt of a large sum as his share of prize money in the later part of Rogers's privateering expedition. As I noted long ago,[2] by keeping to the desert-island theme for his long romance Defoe soon exhausted the possibilities of psychological truth, though he enjoyed and made his readers enjoy extra invented details, and the startling intrusion of Friday. The poor black "heathen," who was to be taught by Crusoe, appears when Crusoe has been about fifteen years alone and had, according to Defoe, developed into a skilled and, one might say, wealthy agriculturist, an economist and a philosopher. In actual life Crusoe would probably by then have been as savage as Friday. So we can see that the parrot-like academic view of Defoe's story as being realism is a distortion: the popularity of *Robinson Crusoe* is due to the masterly presentation of prosaic fancy and "adventures," with two or three tense moments, such as Crusoe's discovery of the one footprint on the sandy shore.

By concentrating on the early eighteenth-century *Robinson Crusoe* romance, and the true biographical story of Alexander Selkirk, I realize that one gets only half-way to answering the question I started with. Defoe was perhaps the simplest of the great novelists, and in famous novels with more depth of characterization and many more characters it might be puzzling to estimate what is "real" or "true," and what is a kind of daydreaming and self-expression. This last would include most of the extremely popular but often quite bad and short-lived fiction. On reflection, however, it can be seen that the "truth" in the best novels of character must be in some degree an expression of the author's mind, and his chief characters will get their imaginative vitality through his deepest feelings or convictions. Among the evidence for this is the difference as a whole between the fiction of one author and another.

What we are pleased to call "real life," seen actually as we go about, or in biography, is not necessarily any truer (and probably less true)

[2] *The Real Robinson Crusoe*, 1939.

than fiction that is imaginatively more sensitive and profound than Defoe's. How often do we discover that our own view of another person is very different from the view held by somebody else? Do we even know ourselves so surely? Let us never forget either the poet's comment on what it would mean "to see ourselves as others see us."

Anyhow it is undeniable that biography can distort the truth about a person as easily as any work of fiction. In fact the subjective element in biography, as in history, ensures that an element of unacknowledged fiction is always present.

R. L. MEGROZ

Not in Utopia, subterranean fields,
Or some secreted island, Heaven knows where!
But in the very world, which is the world
Of all of us — the place where in the end
We find our happiness, or not at all!

—WILLIAM WORDSWORTH

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE ABIDING PROBLEMS*

VALUE JUDGMENTS comprise an area of human discourse which has proved itself among the least tractable to the linguistic analysis so fashionable among philosophers in our day. The theory of Kant remains a seminal exposition for those who find value judgments irreducible: he speaks for those in every age who find the moral imperative an ultimate feature of their environment, and who are willing to act upon the reality of its existence. Yet, of course, the monumental thought-system of Immanuel Kant cannot influence the reader without considerable effort on his part, and for this reason Professor Paton's *The Moral Law*, a new translation of Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, is particularly welcome. The value of this work lies particularly in Professor Paton's useful and full (pp. 13-52) analysis of the argument, and also in his helpful notes and index. It is altogether a very handy edition of a work which, since it first appeared in 1948, has established itself as an essential textbook for the student of philosophy and a sound presentation for the intelligent layman.

In his discussion of the moral law, Kant took his stand on certain fundamentals: that obedience to the moral law is to take action for its own sake, for its intrinsic goodness; that the will is autonomous, assenting to the moral law without any ulterior end; that moral judgments are universalizable with respect to the subject. The extent to which philosophical approaches to the question of morality have diverged since Kant's day is clearly revealed in Pepita Haezrahi's *The Price of Morality*, a work comprising a thorough, carefully-arranged and well-documented enquiry into the nature of "goodness," of right moral actions and decisions, in human affairs, and of connected philosophical problems.

From a treatment of the non-naturalist view of ethics, with particular reference to Moore's *Principia Ethica*, Miss Haezrahi turns to the naturalist and pluralist views. The limitations of a relativist and subjectivist approach to the understanding of goodness, depending on personal approval; the concern to establish the primacy of moral worth over all other values; a full discussion of the nature of values, as "correlates of judgments of approval" or "correlates of desire, will, and action"; and the conclusion that "the notions of 'good' and 'value' . . . are incapable of supplying a self-sufficient and secure basis for a system of ethics," all deserve careful examination. The relationship between "good" and "right" is comprehensively examined with special reference to the systems of Sir David Ross and E. F. Carritt; pluralism is rejected in favour of the need for

> a satisfactory system of ethics constructed solely on the idea of "the right" . . . a "pure" morality of right.

The major attempt at such a system

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* *The Price of Morality*. By PEPITA HAEZRAHI. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 286 pp. 1961. 35*s*.); *The Moral Law: KANT'S "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals." A New Translation with Analysis and Notes*. By H. J. PATON. (Hutchinson University Library, London. 151 pp. 1961. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

was made by Kant. His ethical notions are fully examined by the author, who carefully criticizes the shortcomings of such interpreters of Kant's thought as Rudolf Otto. Kant's problems and solutions are illuminated with references to the ideas of Rousseau, J. S. Mill and Sartre; many other aspects of twentieth-century thought, ranging from biblical theology to nihilism, are brought into the author's discussion of the central issues of morality.

It is a discussion notable for its imaginative approaches no less than for its comprehensiveness. Miss Haezrahi's treatment of the abiding problems of human existence can be read with profit by all those in Occident and Orient who seek to choose for themselves — as the author insists they must — a satisfying understanding of goodness and morality.

B. G. COOPER

Comparative Religion. By GEOFFREY PARRINDER. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 130 pp. 1962. 16*s*.)

> Unless all existence is a medium of revelation no particular revelation is possible. ...Only if God is revealed in the history of Syrians and Philistines can he be revealed in the history of Israel.
>
> By the word of God — that is to say by Jesus Christ — Isaiah and Plato, Zoroaster, Buddha and Confucius uttered and wrote such truths as they declared. There is only one Divine Light, and every man in his own measure is enlightened by it.

These words of the late Archbishop Temple are among the many quotations from leaders of the whole family of living faiths used in this balanced and comprehensive book to show how the best-informed interpretations of those faiths make religion a power to unite, not divide, mankind. World harmony can only be achieved through religious faith, but it must be the true religion of an open, honest mind that is not directed to destroying what it cannot understand, but, in charity to all men and a desire for the truth of them, to seeking greater understanding of other beliefs and growing in awareness of the wide wonder of the One God's manifold revelation.

The Christian asks to be judged by the best in his faith. If he himself is true to it he must accord the same treatment to others. It is not for any to seek to reform another's religion but to recognize and applaud the reforms which are all the time being carried out from within.

What is needed at this challenging time of "the confrontation of religions" is not so much a new synthesis as a new outlook, which will wean men from talking about other faiths in terms of "we" and "they," and lead them to discuss the whole glorious diversity of God's colourful garden of beliefs in terms of "we" and "us."

D. S. MAXTED

The Upanishads, an Anthology. By D. S. SARMA. (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. xvi+307 pp. 1961. Rs. 2.00)

If the Upaniṣads mean to the Hindu the final phase of the Vedic doctrine (*Vedānta*), if a Schelling or a Schopenhauer finds in them satisfying answers to some fundamental problems in life, it does not mean that philosophy forms their entire content. Matters of minor importance abound in them, and these are "likely to puzzle and vex the modern reader" anxious to benefit from their main teaching. To weed

these out and preserve most of the passages therein of "deep insight, beauty of expression and profound understanding" is the object of the present anthology.

The famous *ten* Upaniṣads (*Daśopaniṣads*) are subjected to this treatment along with the *Śvetāśvatara*, and the Sanskrit text is accompanied by a fairly readable translation into English. The *Notes* at the end give explanations based on Śaṅkara's commentary on these Upaniṣads. In the valuable Prolegomena of the veteran author it is refreshing to find that he has at length realized the true spirit of Hindu tradition and modified many of his earlier views. The present reviewer in particular feels flattered by the endorsement here of some of his own efforts, for about two decades now, in his *Ātman* (Adyar, 1944) and elsewhere. Here is really an able and reliable introduction to the very foundations of all our philosophy. A few printing mistakes have crept in both in the Sanskrit and in the English portions, and these need correction. Adoption of the well-known system of transliteration would have helped the Western reader especially.

H. G. NARAHARI

Saint Francis of Assisi. By ELIZABETH GOUDGE. (Hodder and Stoughton, London. 287 pp. 1961. 3*s.* 6*d.*); *The Life and Thought of Kierkegaard for Everyman.* By JOHN A. GATES. (Hodder and Stoughton, London. 155 pp. 1961. 5*s.*)

No two men could be more dissimilar than Francis of Assisi and Sören Kierkegaard — the one reflecting the mediæval world, the other the modern; the one ascetic, yet enjoying the simple things of everyday life and joyous in religion; the other sharing the social amenities of his time but almost neurotically dwelling upon the darker experiences of the soul.

They are of course complementary and neither can be fully understood apart from his environment, circumstances and experiences. It is not enough to read the sayings of Francis and the anecdotes recorded by his followers or the books that Kierkegaard wrote. Miss Goudge and Dr. Gates enable us to know the men themselves and so to gain insight of more than a purely intellectual kind into their interpretations of human nature and of God. These authors have not been content to light upon interesting subjects and to throw off popular, superficial sketches which people read and forget. The two studies can indeed be read with ease and enjoyment, but they are contributions of permanent value for all who would appreciate the character, spirit and achievements of the saint and the thinker whose influence has become world-wide.

Both had a practical purpose, which was to enable common men to follow Jesus Christ, the way, the truth and the life. From the humble beginning that Francis made there grew a great movement within the Church, reaching out to the secular world, and Miss Goudge, being historically minded, provides us with a rich picture of what this meant in those early days. Kierkegaard, despite his own primary intention, has been regarded as the theologians' writer. But Dr. Gates, in his exposition and his careful selection from Kierkegaard's writings, makes us realize how much the layman also may find to stimulate and enlighten him.

BASIL A. YEAXLEE

The Relevance of Whitehead: Philosophical Essays in Commemoration of the Centenary of the Birth of Alfred North Whitehead. Edited by IVOR LECLERC. (The Muirhead Library of Philosophy. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London; The Macmillan Company, New York. 383 pp. 1961. 42*s.*)

This substantial addition to the famous Muirhead Library of Philosophy is of a nature which is excellently indicated by its title. Its fifteen essays are related to one another only in so far as they are all in some way related to Whitehead, whether Whitehead be the object of interpretation, or the object of comparison, or the source of inspiration or direction. That the academic writers of distinction who contribute to the volume come chiefly from the United States, although also from Canada, England, Scotland, and Germany, makes one recall that Whitehead, at the age of 63, became Professor of Philosophy at Harvard, after retiring from the Chair of Applied Mathematics in the University of London.

The range, depth and audacity of Whitehead's thought; the length, indefatigableness and vast productivity of his life of intellectual adventure; and not least his faith in the subjugation of force by persuasion receive here impressive testimony, although little is said on his influential thoughts on education, despite a linguistic reference on p. 126, and an empiricist reference on p. 336, to his *Aims of Education* (1929).

The volume is a fitting commemoration of Whitehead by its scholarship and thought in the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, linguistics, philosophy of science, philosophy of history, æsthetics, ethics and theology. For in his Gifford Lectures, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* (1929), Whitehead sought to expound his *Philosophy of Organism*, which would supplement a "criticism of detached questions" by "a more sustained effort of constructive thought" designed

> to frame a scheme of ideas, the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme,

thereby also coming

> to construct a system of ideas which bring the æsthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which have their orgin in natural science (Preface to *Process and Reality*).

But in this same preface Whitehead admits that, for all its realistic basis, his cosmology finally approximates to the absolute idealism of F. H. Bradley. This alone, evidently, must make him suspect to contemporary positivism. But today also our human world feels more threatened, and sees futility more ubiquitous, than in 1929. In the doctrine, therefore, that "the creative advance of the world is the becoming, the perishing, and the objective immortalities of those things which jointly constitute stubborn fact" (*Process and Reality*, p. ix), it might be expected to find something too obscure, and in any case too arid, for its spiritual salvation. In all the inventive and eloquent elaboration of this doctrine, in all the tormenting vagueness of its rich and magisterial context, even what might be finally interpreted as the main jewel might be found insufficient. It is doubtful whether *The Relevance of Whitehead* will do much to make its hero seem more convincing. But it should do much to reveal his inexpugnable relevance to the diverse streams of recent philosophy, and even to establish him as an intellectual giant.

M. KAYE

The Teachings of Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi in His Own Words. Edited by ARTHUR OSBORNE. (Rider and Company, London. 200 pp. Frontispiece. 1962. 21*s.*)

For fifty years Sri Ramana Maharshi was visited by Europeans, including many from this country, and an account of his teaching was given in a previous book entitled *The Collected Works of Ramana Maharshi* (Rider and Company). Mr. Arthur Osborne states that his object in this book is to build up a general exposition of the Maharshi's teachings by selecting and fitting together passages from conversations with him and extracts from the previous book.

In his preface Mr. Osborne gives us an account of the Maharshi's first mystical experience, when a youth of seventeen. It was an experience which had a lasting effect on him. Like many other moments of illumination it came to him after brooding on the subject of death, and on the nature of the "self." Death clearly entailed the disappearance of the body and of the mind.

> The body dies but the Spirit that transcends it cannot be touched by death. . . . I perceived directly, almost without thought-process [that] "I" was something very real, the only real thing about my present state, and all the conscious activity connected with my body was centred on that "I." From that moment onwards the "I" or Self focused attention on itself by a powerful fascination. Fear of death had vanished once and for all. Absorption in the Self continued unbroken from that time on.

The first chapter of this absorbingly interesting book is devoted to the basic Hindu teaching of the greater "Self" (spelt with a capital). This is a Self which can be equated with pure consciousness. And this greater Self is the only Reality within ourselves. "It underlies all limitations." "It has no names or forms. . . . It transcends speech and is beyond description. . . ."

In so short a review as this one has to be it is impossible to do justice to Mr. Arthur Osborne's book. All that a reviewer is able to do is to recommend the book to readers of THE ARYAN PATH.

KENNETH WALKER

Precepts for Perfection: Teachings of the Disciples of Sri Ramakrishna. Compiled by SABINA THORNE. (Ganesh and Co., Madras. 234 pp. 1961. Rs. 10.00)

This book is a rosary, as it were, of seven hundred brief precepts on religion and its practice by fourteen of Sri Ramakrishna's sixteen monastic disciples, three of his householder followers and his consort, Srimati Sarada Devi. Specially designed for the American devotees of the Master, it will certainly appeal to all who maintain an attitude of respect for every religion, never allow themselves to be swayed by the diversities of human tendencies and cherish eternal truth. The counsels are multifarious but whatever may be the theme, the language always is precise, simple, terse and homely. Each utterance is stamped unmistakably with the personality of the preceptor, each of whom under the watchful influence of the Master grew spiritually to his full stature, without distorting his individual temperament.

The sentiments collected together in this book are heart-warming. One would like to linger long over this definition of happiness: "Happiness is the reflection on the mind of our blissful or divine nature undisturbed by desires, passions or activities." A great man, according to one of the preceptors, is one who keeps calm in danger; has the power to say the right thing in the

presence of many people; in prosperity has forgiveness; in battle shows his prowess; in learning, desire; and is always intent upon doing good.

The chief merit of this absorbingly spiritual anthology is that it is ideally suited to all types of men -- it has a message for all. To practise these precepts one must have devotion, love for truth and humility — "Be sincere in your practice, words and deeds — God wants sincerity, truthfulness and love."

The unostentatious get-up of the book has a charm of its own and the large type used is easy on the eyes. The unfamiliar Vedanta terms have generally been italicized upon first use. ("*Nirvikalpa samadhi*" on p. 21 certainly deserves this treatment.)

The book is meant rather as a guide to be picked up often and read, a maxim or two at a time, as the occasion demands, and will certainly convey to all weary and trouble-racked ones the encouraging message of secure hope.

DILIP KUMAR SEN

One's Own Good — And Another's. By DAVID MAURICE. (32 pp.); *The Four Sacred Shrines.* By PIYADASSI THERA. (21 pp.); *How to Teach Buddhism to Children.* By HELMUTH KLAR. (22 pp.); *The Greatest Buddhist Festival* (*Vesak*). By D. T. DEVENDRA. (14 pp); *The Light of Asia,* Books VI-VIII. By EDWIN ARNOLD. (61 pp.); *Women in Early Buddhist Literature.* By I. B. HORNER. (22 pp.); *Manual of Insight.* By LEDI SAYADAW. (87 pp.); *Advice to Rahula.* (40 pp.); *The Four Noble Truths.* By FRANCIS STORY, ANAGARIKA SUGATANANDA. (63 pp.). (Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Ceylon. 1961.)

One's Own Good is an excellent piece of writing. There is no room for wishful thinking here. The author has certainly succeeded in helping us to "formulate some thoughts on the real and lasting good of yourself and others, and of the Buddhist teaching thereon." *The Four Sacred Shrines* gives us information on the four important places to be visited in India by Buddhist pilgrims and tourists. The article includes historical notes on the Emperor Asoka, the work of British archæologists and the link between India and Ceylon. In *How to Teach Buddhism to Children,* the author, a devout and learned follower of the Master's Teaching, has been able to write such an article from practical experience with his own children and "so of Western children in general." Parents and teachers should find sound guidance in this article. The pamphlet on the Vesak Festival is indeed a happy little article. D. T. Devendra tells us how the people of Ceylon celebrate the three important events in the life of the Buddha.

A little brochure gives us Books VI-VIII of the famous *Light of Asia.* Books I-V will be issued in due course, but in the meantime we can follow the Poet's inspiring rendering of the Teaching, which culminates in the Buddha's Enlightenment.

Women in Early Buddhist Literature was given as a lecture to the All-Ceylon Buddhist Women's Association, Colombo, in January 1961. The President of the Pali Text Society has set out some basic facts with regard to the social position of women in those far-off days in India. Many women entered the Bhikkhuni Order of Nuns (now unfortunately extinct) to seek for peace, self-mastery and the light of knowledge. About forty Nuns are said to have been contemporaries of the Buddha.

Manual of Insight is of course highly technical, dealing with the profound subjects of *Vipassanā Dīpanī.* Great care has been taken over the translation from

Burmese. This valuable treatise should be of considerable help to those not familiar with the Pali language. It includes a summary of the lifework of the Venerable Sayadaw.

Advice to Rahula contains four discourses of the Buddha addressed to his son. Each discourse has an Introduction, followed by explanatory Notes on the Pali terms used in the discourses. A useful publication for self-study on the *Dhamma*.

The Four Noble Truths gives us the Foundations of Buddhism. The author has written very fully around the Four Noble Truths; a lucid and comprehensive essay.

SISTER VAJIRA

Nachiketā. By SUDHAKAR DIKSHIT. Hindi. (Chetana, Ltd., Bombay. 80 pp. 1960. Rs. 3.50)

"What happens after death?" is an eternal mystery which has troubled the enquiring mind ever since it started enquiring. The solution is not yet in sight in spite of the advancing strides of science. Man continues asking himself, "What is life?" "Must every good thing come to an end?" "Is there no stopping to this end?" — "*Kabhī kyā hogā ant anant?*" in Sudhakar Dikshit's words.

The self-same mystery is at the root of the spiritual lore of the seers of yore. It has been the pivotal theme of the *Upanishads*, especially of the *Kaṭha Upanishad*, recording the dialogue between Yama (the god of death) and Nachiketā, the young son of the sage Vājaśravā. The rippling poem in Hindi under review has been inspired by this very *Kaṭha Upanishad*. It does not claim to be an exact translation of the original Sanskrit. It is merely an echo, an outcome of the response and appreciation of the author. His adaptation is to be taken as "a mere tribute of adoration, set in verse," "*padya-baddha śraddhāñjali mātra*," as the poet puts it. Being an artist as well, his appreciation has found expression in a few pictures, too, that illustrate the mystic poem. Two of them are particularly impressive: one depicting the stream of life, and the other of the universe, conceived, after the *Upanishads*, as a peepul tree upside down, the *ūrdhvamūla adhaśśākha aśvattha*.

Sudhakar Dikshit is to be congratulated on introducing this new vein into the growing body of Hindi literature. Even in the present-day glamour-ridden world there is no dearth of people who delight in such serious and soul-searching poems as the present one is.

B. CH. CHHABRA

The Tyranny of the Majority. By E. W. MARTIN. (Pall Mall Press, London. 164 pp. 1961. 17*s*. 6*d*.)

Mr. Martin's theme is that, in our mass society, cultural, spiritual and business life is controlled by what he, rather confusingly, calls "the middle-class majority." This

> is engaged in persuading and hypnotizing the no longer poverty-stricken mass to believe in myths and accept false business standards to bolster up the cracking image of a secular and bourgeois society.

Since this means the imposition of conformity on the mass it is a tyranny; but "opportunity for the renewal of democracy through the application of equality" remains. Such renewal "will be dependent on a movement towards radicalism." The urgent task is working out a "people's culture, to ensure that the worker is to take part in the mental

life of society."

These ideas are developed with a wealth of quotation, historical background and reference to authorities — especially de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill (whom he reveres) and Marx (whom he sometimes misrepresents). He is excellent when discussing culture or nineteenth-century radicalism; weakest when assessing socialism or working-class organizations.

It is a stimulating book. Every page contains something to applaud, to quarrel with or to think about. So it is a pity that the lively profusion of ideas sometimes becomes disarray, and that some words, including "majority," are used in confusing and even inconsistent ways. More specific steps for combating his "tyranny" would have been welcome, and it is surely too easy an optimism to suggest — as he seems to on p. 153 — that it has only to be recognized to begin to yield.

H. J. FYRTH

The Greatness of Man: An Essay on Dostoyevsky and Whitman. By PERRY D. WESTBROOK. (Thomas Yoseloff, London. 175 pp. 1961. 25*s*.)

The author of this frankly states in his Preface that there can be nothing new left to say about the two writers discussed: the Russian Dostoyevsky and the North American Walt Whitman. But, as he points out, there "is the newness of . . . first impact on each generation of minds." And on the preceding generations, too, so far as they are still alert and questing but have missed the two contributors to the world's literature and thought.

The ones who have missed, as well as those with most of their reading before them, are advised to read this Essay first, more especially in its study of Dostoyevsky, who may be not so well appreciated in Western Europe and the United States as Whitman. The general viewpoint of these two men does offer a definite hope for the future of humanity as it breaks away from old (but not always *ancient*) limitations of thinking, feeling and action.

Professor Westbrook points out that "love to Dostoyevsky and Whitman was the most powerful force in the world — more powerful even than hate." And he claims that what they say "must not be blurred by irrelevancies . . . Whitman's sexual orientation and Dostoyevsky's epilepsy." These should be seen apart from the spiritual love.

I leave you to read the book.

E. V. HAYES

Jane Addams: A Centennial Reader. (The Macmillan Company, New York. 330 pp. Frontispiece. 1960. $6.00)

Social work has had a very patchy growth, but now it seems to be coming into its own, with the social worker being accorded something approaching professional status. It is, however, still suspect, and especially in the beginning the wrong sort of people were often connected with it. In many cases where such work was done from the starting point of "charity" — in the most superficial sense of that term — the results were often the opposite of what was hoped. It has been said that to expect gratitude for a kindness done is to ask for more than is given.

Jane Addams learnt all this, and more, in her pioneer work at Hull House in Chicago. The Social Settlement is her unique contribution to this developing science, and her paper, "The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements,"

published in 1892, is a classic. In it she defines a Settlement as

> an experimental effort to aid in the solution of the social and industrial problems which are engendered by the modern conditions of life in a great city.

Jane Addams came from that upper-middle-class mould which seems to have produced so many of the best social workers. Her influence began to spread outside her immediate locality, and she became active in demanding legislation to curb such abuses as child labour and "sweat shops." In addition she grew sympathetic towards Trade Unionism, and eventually became a Pacifist, taking the leading part in establishing the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, a very fine organization still extremely active.

This book is useful for social workers of all nationalities and beliefs. It shows how effective social service can be, once it is liberated from the stigma of "charity," and is endowed with that openness of heart and mind which judges not, but ever strives to understand.

VIVIAN WORTHINGTON

Poor Kit Smart. By CHRISTOPHER DEVLIN. (Rupert Hart-Davis, London. 200 pp. 1961. 16*s*.)

The madness of poets is a disquieting subject to contemplate, and not least for its uncertainty. Did these finely adjusted spirits really topple into the mental chaos that their humdrum contemporaries allege? Cowper and John Clare — despite the latter's luminous asylum poems — seem undoubted cases; Blake's madness consisted in a visionary expression too personal to be understood. But Christopher Smart has long been something of a mystery. The immortal "Song to David" was published after seven years in a madhouse; few knew what to make of it, and none knew from what deep brooding it emerged. The discovery in the 1930s of an incoherent liturgical fragment, "Jubilate Agno," confirmed — for a while — the verdict of total insanity. Its odd juxtapositions chimed like glorious nonsense to the uninitiated. (And that meant most of us.) In our own century James Joyce and Gertrude Stein were not put in mental homes; but Smart lived in the Age of Reason, when atom-splitting by poets, physicists or painters was yet unforeseen.

Scholars have censured Smart for alcoholism, exhibitionism and persecution-mania. Sir Russell Brain explained him recently as a cyclothyme. Father Devlin tackles the problem from another angle in his biographical study. He is competent, as few are, to interpret "Jubilate Agno" in the light of such intimacy with the Apocryphal books as Smart himself possessed. Many passages, so expounded, now yield a meaning that points to the fanatic rather than the lunatic. Religious fervour had produced obsessions of a divine and messianic mission. This was, to be "the Reviver of ADORATION amongst ENGLISH-MEN," and to replace the Roman by the Anglican Church — a conviction that led to a breach with his Catholic wife. A more appealing aim was to extend God's kingdom to the whole creation, so that animals, birds and flowers, and not least his worshipful cat Jeoffrey, shared the blessing. The finest features of his mania were to blossom in the triumphant "Song to David."

> Unfortunately [as Father Devlin comments], no sooner was it produced than he threw away his "Franciscan" gladness and began to assume the unnatural, wry-necked posture of the misunderstood prophet.

For such a mind there could be no lasting peace. His outer life became

more troubled and penurious; his friends wrote him off despairingly, and he himself lost faith in his messiahship. The story is sad on any interpretation; but Father Devlin has approached it with so much intuitive sympathy that it appeals with a far deeper, closer sadness. We feel nearer to Smart and to humanity. The distintegrated mind is dead to thought, but the organism that can suffer, reason and aspire around its one half-glorious deception is a case that strikes home poignantly. There, but for the Grace of God — which Smart so coveted — go many of us, blindly, at all epochs, nursing the aberration without the genius. *Poor Kit Smart* is in size a modest volume, but its overtone and queries fill the air.

SYLVA NORMAN

Tennyson: The Growth of a Poet. By JEROME HAMILTON BUCKLEY. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A. 298 pp. 1960. $5.75)

During his own lifetime, Tennyson was to many more than a poet, more even than the Poet Laureate; he was the Bard, he was a Prophet. Then came the violent "reaction," and Tennyson seemed to offer a ready target to the devaluers and the debunkers. The time for a sober revaluation has come, and Professor Buckley has seized his opportunity. Tennyson's poetry necessarily grew out of his life, and his life in its turn was moulded by the climate of thought and opinion and controversy that prevailed during the Victorian Age. On the other hand, poetry is more than biography or history: while it may have its origins in both, once it has achieved triumphant release, it is itself, it is its own law — it is autonomous, sovereign.

Professor Buckley has made good use of all the new material that is now available and also some important unpublished material, and by studying Tennyson's poems in their chronological sequence he is able to picture the "growth of a poet" from the hesitant first attempts, through experiment, partial success and failure, to the "one clear call" that became the distinctive Tennysonian note of metrical adequacy and emotional urgency. Professor Buckley has really been able to read Tennyson afresh, resolutely keeping at bay the critical allergies of our time. There are unexpected, but rewarding, comparisons: for example when he compares Tennyson's "sense of dissociation from the darkened earth" with the "loneliness, the *isolement*, of Berlioz," or when he finds in Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* an "apposite gloss on the faith of *In Memoriam*." The entire gamut from the squall of despair to calm of mind is covered in the crystalline stanzas of *In Memoriam*. The unconventional *Maud* is neither "mad" nor mere poetic "mud" but rather the vivid recordation of the impact of beauty and love on a resentful and maddened temperament. The *Idylls*, although it fails to impress as an epic creation, has nevertheless its great moments; and, notwithstanding its structural weakness, it does build "somewhat like [Shakespeare's] *Troilus* to a tragic denouement, which the temper of a whole civilization rather than the sin of any one individual makes inevitable." Professor Buckley thus sees Tennyson, not only as the gifted poet of moods and moments, but also a major poet:—

> Tennyson cannot be denied the essential attributes of majority: dedication to the poet's calling, command of his medium, range of vision, capacity for growth, magnitude of performance, and place in a tradition as one who, consciously indebted to a literary past, in turn influences the course of subsequent poetry.

Like the other great Victorians, Ten-

nyson too was earnest without stint, and a like earnestness and solidity of performance also characterize Professor Buckley's scholarly and authoritative memoir. It is likely to remain the standard study of the poet for many years to come.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

The New Year of Grace: An Anthology for Youth and Age. Compiled and edited with personal commentaries by VICTOR GOLLANCZ. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 510. pp. Coloured Frontispiece. 1961. 15*s*.)

The New Year of Grace is something more than a reprint of the previous Gollancz anthology (*A Year of Grace*). Whereas the purpose of the original volume was "to express a mood about God and man," the anthologist seeks to make this new collection of particular interest to young people. This he would seem to have succeeded in doing Moreover, the addition of valuable explanatory linking passages from his own pen also enhances its appeal to older people, for the book thus becomes a more homogeneous whole meant to be read straight through from beginning to end.

Quotations range from the *Bhagavad-Gita* and *The Voice of the Silence* to writers such as Péguy, Proust and Walter de la Mare. Of particular interest is the inclusion of a number of Hasidic stories and sayings.

Some idea of the calibre of this noble book can be gathered from Martin Buber's lines on Humility:—

> ...the purer a man is and the more perfect, the more intensely is he aware of being but a part, of but having a place in the great community of his fellow human beings. This is humility. To feel the universe as a sea, and oneself as a wave in it — this is humility.

H. M. LISHMAN

India and the West. By BARBARA WARD. (Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Delhi. 247 pp. 1961. Rs. 2.00)

India and the West is a challenge to the West, to the moral conscience of the West, to do the just thing by India. The old polarization in a democratic society of the increasing wealth of the few and the growing impoverishment of the many has reappeared at the world level. The West should not lay the flattering unction to her soul by a gesture of charity but set right her folly by an act of justice. The West should envisage a Marshall Plan for India for her to achieve an economic "take-off." What is half done is ill done and what is ill done is a writing on the wall in this indivisible world where social justice and neighbourly concern are an imperative method of self-preservation. Unneighbourly prosperity is a fatal cancer and co-operative travail is a vital equity. The economic battles of the West have to be fought in the slums of India, ragged with appalling proverty, with the vision of Christianity and the tenacity of Communism. In men's imagination Communism cuts deeper than Christianity and in the ex-colonial territories the good that is done by the West is attributed to the West's fear of Russia. India's planning is a gigantic experiment in economic growth within a liberal framework, unlike the militarized modernization in some other countries which is impressive but suicidal. If India is subjected to the harassing and humiliating help of three steps forward and two back, and fails — Asia fails, the U.S.A. fails, Britain fails.

Britain has a special responsibility to complete her half-finished task in India. Barbara Ward is half apologetic about

Britain's failure; the author's impartiality sounds almost like a vindication of the *laissez-faire* of the English. As the saying is, the snake does not die nor does the stick break. Though the book is a very fine and sympathetic, fervent and cogently argued appeal for India, the writer seems to think often that anything good in India today, like a sense of social justice, for instance, was an imported commodity. "*Sarve janaḥ sukhino bhavantu*" or "*Vasudhaiva kutumbakam*" are not from a book of quotations in some European language but the pervasive texture of Hindu Dharma, to which the State and the Church bowed — a concept unparalleled elsewhere. Granting the power of the catalyst of the West in the cultural advance of India, it is to be recognized that any *coiffure* is possible if there is a rich braid of hair.

This excellent and lucid book is a reprimand to the West for her moral immobility; it is a challenge to India to tighten her belt and set her house in order.

There is a misprint on p. 220: "resorted" for "restored." The author and The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, deserve to be congratulated on the production of a book which breathes such affectionate concern for India.

K. VISWANATHAM

Sotto Voce. Second series: Our New Rulers. By VIGHNESWARA (N. RAGHUNATHAN). (B. G. Paul and Co., Madras. 396 pp. 1961. Ordinary ed., Rs. 5.00; library ed., Rs. 6.00; abroad, 10*s*.; $1.25)

Vighneswara (pen-name of Shri N. Raghunathan, formerly of *The Hindu*) was a familiar figure to readers of *Swatantra* (edited by the late Khasa Subba Rao) to which he contributed a weekly column, *Sotto Voce*. The articles reprinted in this volume cover the period, February 1949 to August 1952, and deal with a diversity of issues that came under public discussion during that period. Vighneswara, however, discusses them as a free lance, unfettered by the demands of conventionality.

The *tour de force* of Vighneswara's writings is their versatility and their brilliance. They exude scholarship, a sly and not too boisterous humour, which delights but does not offend, and above all a far-sighted and astute judgment of men and matters. He is a literary craftsman of a high order.

These articles were written during a period when our Constitution was in the initial stages of its working and the Congress party had, as it still has, the sole direction of affairs. Much of what Vighneswara said in his articles in that singularly significant period of our country's history on the doings of the Congress as our "New Rulers," its policies and programmes, can, in a remarkable degree, be regarded as applicable to contemporary times. The years have gone by; but the policies have not changed much, neither have the men behind them. In fact, with the years, both have become stereotyped. Willy-nilly, the policies have the effect of constricting the scope of the freedom of the individual and extending "Statism."

All in all, the volume makes delightful reading, whether one agrees with everything that Vighneswara says or not; but with most of what he says, many of us would probably agree.

C. V. H. RAO

The Black Death: A Chronicle of the Plague Compiled from Contemporary Sources. By JOHANNES NOHL. Translated by C. H. CLARKE. (Unwin Books

No 21. 160 pp. Illustrated. 6*s.*); *An Idealist View of Life*. By S. RADHAKRISHNAN. (Unwin Books No. 24. 279 pp. 9*s.* 6*d.*) (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 1961.)

The intelligent "middle-brow" is again catered for in these further Unwin paperbacks. *The Black Death* is reduced "without expurgation or distortion" from the original 1926 edition, the compiler's purpose being "to demonstrate the devastating inroads made in former times by epidemics into the spiritual and social life of the various nations." The term "plague" includes other epidemics (dancing manias, etc.) and the terrible history refutes those who bemoan the troubles of their own century as the worst known. The book chronicles, however, simply the animal-personal, vital life, and we move to a different atmosphere with *An Idealist View of Life*. Dr. Radhakrishnan's luminous synthesis of the "Two Cultures" surveys the challenges and claims of various viewpoints, and the validity of religious experience; his outstanding chapters on "Intellect and Intuition" and "The Spirit in Man"; his consideration of the destiny of "human personality" and its working relations with nature; his reverent acceptance of the ultimate reality, ever-beyond and ever-within the cosmos; all these make the book indeed as claimed "a complete philosophical education in itself." It is good to have it re-issued.

L. MARR

A LETTER FROM LONDON

London, May 1st, 1962

ON THIS FIRST DAY OF MAY 1962 men and women all over the world have been demonstrating their desire for peace. Instead of workers marching in procession carrying Trade Union banners, the people of Britain have been sitting and squatting outside the American Embassy in London and its Consulates in provincial towns to protest against the decision of the Great Powers to resume nuclear tests. But one fact remains. As the *Daily Herald* pointed out, the world has changed out of recognition since the struggle of the trade unionist was for simple basic rights. we are now in the midst of revolutionary changes which in a generation will make our present world seem as remote to our children as the world of Keir Hardie already is to us. Today there is full employment in Britain. Many working men drive their own cars and take their families for holidays in Europe. In fact there is general freedom unimagined even fifteen years ago.

In spite of this rosy side of life there is still a dominant fear of the sack which is haunting Britain's factories. And unemployment in 1961 is a heavier burden than it used to be before the war. This is because most of the workers have hire-purchase commitments, pay high rents or mortgages, spend heavily on clothes and are accustomed to many home comforts which their fathers and grandfathers never saw. Therefore a Labour M.P., Mr. John Diamond, has introduced a Bill in Parliament which proposes minimum standards of compensation for men declared redundant. His Bill suggests that a redundant worker should get a basic severance pay-off of one week's money for every year of service to his firm.

According to the Ministry of Labour between 3,000,000 and 3,500,000 workers are at present covered by some kind of redundancy arrangement out of a total labour force of 24,000,000. And even if Mr. Diamond's proposal were ac-

cepted it would still leave Britain far behind most Continental countries in legislating against the harsher effects of redundancy. This is because immediately after the war many European countries adopted legal codes to protect their workers against redundancy. For instance, Italy introduced, as early as in 1924, a law for salaried workers providing two weeks' pay for every year of service. This was extended in 1942 to cover all workers and in 1960 the severance pay was stepped up to one month's pay for every year of service.

In France, West Germany and the United States, there are no laws to govern redundancy compensation. But their workers are better covered by industry-wide agreements than in Britain. In America the motor-car industry has its guaranteed annual wage scheme which assists its laid-off workers with up to 75 per cent of normal wages, including State benefits, for up to a year. And about a half of the larger manufacturing companies in the States have some form of severance pay scheme.

A minimum notice carrying cash compensation is laid down by law in Belgium for manual and white-collar workers. A similar labour code was introduced in 1960 in Austria. In Greece severance payments are the law for salaried employees. In Yugoslavia workers with fifteen years' service in the same firm are entitled to four months' pay if they are redundant.

Although Britain may lag in this respect behind the Continental countries, it does not necessarily follow that she is not becoming politically more progressive than she has been. Lord Boothby, who belongs to no political party and can be said to be a detached observer, told the *Scotsman* representative that there are signs of a more Radical element coming into present British politics. He thinks it is that element in the Liberal Party which accounts for their progress now. People are weary of reactionary Conservatism and doctrinaire Socialism.

According to Lord Boothby the Tories are over-tired. British democracy is not working well at the moment. It is absolutely dependent for its functioning on an effective alternative Government and that seems to be missing.

> We have had ten years of Tory rule [he said], and what is lacking is a sense of freshness and of new minds thinking of new policies. It is very different across the Atlantic. The new American Government has given a zip to the whole country with fresh minds and fresh ideas.

Lord Boothby has doubts about the Labour Party's ability to win the next General Election with a comfortable majority.

> I admire Gaitskell's courage and strength of character tremendously [he said], but what he does lack is the kind of flair for politics which the young Lloyd George had. And even in the 1920's Lloyd George was still a glamorous figure in the House of Commons. The last corresponding figure in the Labour Party was Aneurin Bevan.

If Labour after the next General Election does not have a clear majority and is dependent on a stronger Liberal group in the House of Commons, Lord Boothby thinks, the Liberals will rightly insist on a Coalition Government.

> I do not see why Labour should object to that. It would probably mean only one Cabinet job for Jo Grimond and a few under-secretaryships.

Lord Boothby thinks Jo Grimond is a charming man but he doubts if he has the fire and flamboyancy which is so desirable in politics. Grimond is better outside the House than in it. Also, said Lord Boothby, the Liberal policy is still slightly blurred. People are apt to

wonder what the difference is between a Liberal and a member of the Tory Party's Bow Group — or even what the difference is between Gaitskell and Grimond. That is not helping the Liberals, although they continue to gain support from people in search of something new in British politics.

Lord Boothby deplores the present tendency to be uninterested in politics unless excitement is whipped up by by-elections. One reason, he thinks, is that the great issues which used to divide the parties are no longer present. Home Rule for Ireland used to rouse all the passions. House of Lords reform was a fierce battle. The class war itself is now finished. Another reason is the absence of great personalities and great orators in the Commons. There used to be more than a dozen of these — people like Lloyd George, Jimmy Maxton, Aneurin Bevan, Robert Horne and John Buchan.

The latest report of the Christian Economic and Social Research Foundation on drink offences, based on police information, makes one shudder. Those who held the view that modern forms of relaxation, such as listening to the radio, watching television programmes, playing golf and driving cars have contributed to reduction in drinking and drunkenness will find that the Foundation's report shows exactly the opposite.

Prosecutions for drunkenness on foot or in cars have risen steadily since 1956. It is estimated that in 1961 there were 82,000 — the highest total since 1920. There has been a marked increase among young people. In 1913, before World War I, there were 189,000 drunks, or more than twice as many as in 1961, when the population was 25 per cent larger. After the splurge of 1920, the year of post-war gratuity spending, drunkenness declined, until, with 30,000 convictions in 1932, it reached a peacetime low point. After that it rose until the war and the austerity 1940's — and now it has picked up fast again.

Drunk-in-charge cases have doubled in six years, which is nearly twice the rate of increase in the number of vehicles. The Foundation thinks that this is due to more persons "prone to excessive consumption of alcohol" becoming drivers.

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's son Adrian has taken issue with UNESCO for suggesting that the works of Jules Verne, Dostoevsky and Agatha Christie have been translated into more languages than those of the creator of Sherlock Holmes. He reminded UNESCO: "My father's works have been translated into more languages than any other except the Bible and the works of William Shakespeare." He also reminded UNESCO that his father's works have been published in 38 countries, for which he, no doubt, continues to collect royalties.

The young Russian poet, Yevgeni Yevtushenko, was asked if he considered himself an "Angry Young Man." He said he was not sure what the phrase meant. But he had enjoyed John Osborne's "England, I Hate You" article in the *Tribune*, edited by Michael Foot. He said: "A real person is always against what is bad in his country and for what is good." Although he was not a member of the Communist Party, he supported its principles. One of his best poems was called "Consider Me a Communist." Yevtushenko is here as the guest of the British Council and is being given every opportunity to do what he wants in Britain.

SUNDER KABADI

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"——————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

This is a transition age in every subject. Theology — the German Lutheran Church in particular — is in a state of flux as regards the question of the historical Jesus. Dr. John Macquarrie, Lecturer in Systematic Theology at the University of Glasgow, stated in a wireless talk (*The Listener*, April 12th, 1962) that there are not a few theologians who, faced with "the negative result that followed from a century of intensive historical research into the facts about Jesus of Nazareth," have realized that no "factually accurate biography" is possible. It is not merely a matter of necessity, but an actual change of viewpoint, influenced by the rise of existentialism, that has made these theologians accept, in place of a human historical figure, the kerygmatic ("proclaimed") Christ of faith, as "God's Word addressed to man."

When this existential interpretation of history is applied to events described in the New Testament, say the Cross and Resurrection of Christ, attention is shifted from the question about the actual observable facts, such as a public execution and the resuscitation of the victim, to the pattern of life and action disclosed in the events — a pattern which may be described as losing one's life so as to find it.... The Christian life consists in the re-enactment of the pattern in present existence, in a dying and rising with Christ, as St. Paul already expressed it in the New Testament. In such re-enactment, the Cross is experienced as reconciliation and the Resurrection as new life. Thus the theological significance of these events is not something that is arbitrarily added on to a bare happening in the past, but is rather the historical possibility of existence disclosed in the events and repeatable in present historical existence.

Not all those who are reaching to this conclusion feel that this means the Gospels should be treated simply as parables, representing a way of life, without any factual basis at all. Dr. Macquarrie is of the opinion that men need living examples of what is preached, otherwise the ideals held up are merely make-believe, if viewed only as fiction. Rudolf Bultmann, one of the German leaders in the controversy, holds that we can go no further than to recognize the existence of a Jesus, a crucified teacher, whose life and personality remain unknown. That is, as Dr. Macquarrie puts it, there must be "a minimum core of factual history" to give reality to the *kerygma*, even though the "essential pattern of Jesus's life" has been "transformed into a mythical drama." In this way the theologian is sufficiently independent of the historian's activities to be able to insist that Christianity is a matter of "faith-commitment." "Thou art the Christ."

It is tantalizing that the talk did not touch upon comparisons made with the lives of the teachers "proclaimed" in other religions, the details of whose mythical life-stories often parallel that of the New Testament. For these parallels give a universal, not sectarian, note to the *kerygma*, and make it, therefore, of that much more value.

Something of a sensation is being caused by a new system of basic mathematics which has been increasingly in demand since it was first published in

America about two years back, and which educationists who have studied it consider could eliminate orthodox basic mathematics within ten years. Its creator, Jakow Trachtenberg, Russian-born but resident in Switzerland, was imprisoned in a German concentration camp during the war, and there devised this speedy system in which no tables (multiplication or division) are needed. Those with less than average skill at figures, it is claimed, achieve almost complete accuracy in the most complex multi-digit problems, at a speed "faster than modern mechanical computers." A Trachtenberg Institute of Mathematics has been opened at Zurich and the system has been adopted by Swiss banks and some government departments. The national press in various parts of the world are making much of it. Doubledays, the American publishers, reckon over 150,000 copies distributed in two years. The British publishers, Souvenir Press (according to *Bookseller*, April 21st, 1962) had to hold back publicity until the fourth printing (total to 34,000 copies) because "since the book was published it has never been in stock for more than one day." Allen and Unwin also have a book in hand on the system, and this, first published in Denmark just before Christmas, sold immediately over 30,000 copies.

Though the invention is an aid to "means," not "ends,"— that is, it has no moral implications — nevertheless it raises one or two philosophical questions. If Herr Trachtenberg had not been driven back upon his own resources, when in the camp, would he have found the impetus to make the discovery, or would the day-to-day life's demands have been too great? How much are "good conditions" a help or a hindrance? Secondly, it makes one realize how largely the whole act of living is dependent on numbers. And, though the essential figures that we grapple with, in the daily transactions, and at the crudest level of matter, may seem mere abstract conventions and conveniences, yet dimly through their emblems we can discern something of the divine Number and Numbers of the mystical Pythagorean and the Indian Sānkhya systems: Numbers as the prototypes of which the whole manifested Cosmos is an ectype.

It is interesting to observe many "cultures" interpenetrating this mundane existence on different wave-lengths, so to say. One world, for example, that of the devotee of "culture" pure and simple, is increasingly catered for by the growth of international Festivals, combining music (primarily) with drama, ballet and "tourism" delights, both urban and scenic. The European Association of Music Festivals (and there are many additional ones outside it) empties out its cornucopia yearly, starting from the beginning of May, with the festivals — ranging from a week to six weeks in length — of Wiesbaden, Bordeaux, Prague, Florence. Then come Vienna, Zurich, Stockholm, Helsinki, Strasbourg, Bath and Holland (in which the whole country is engaged). Then follow Epidaurus (Athens), Granada, Aix-en-Provence, Dubrovnik, Bayreuth (the Wagner cycles), Santander, Athens, Munich, Lucerne, Edinburgh, Besancon, Perugai and Warsaw, ending with West Berlin at the beginning of October. Wealth enough to bring music-lovers together from everywhere!

Another "world" animated by the "get-together" spirit, but otherwise very different, is that of the "International Marches" of the various peace movements engaged in the campaign for nuclear disarmament. *Peace News* (April 27th, 1962) headlines the numbers that took part, over the Easter week-end

holiday, in these protest marches, in the different countries — West Germany, 50,000; U.S.A., 20,000; Canada, 10,000; New Zealand, 800. Denmark, 30,000; Italy, 5,000; and Holland, 4,000 —and describes the reactions of the general populace, as well as the activities of the various groups in their work of non-violence and non-co-operation as a means of controlling the various forms of political violence. The London Hyde Park Rally boasted, as far as could be roughly estimated, an attendance not far short of 150,000.

There are, because of human nature, quite strong divergencies of opinion as to aims and methods, among the groups of nuclear disarmers, but one interesting trend is showing — a growing realization that action simply *against* an evil is insufficient in itself, and that creative, regenerative action must complement the negative aspect. Groups are being built up and trained to give constructive assistance in any large-scale emergency — floods, accidents, etc. — as well as help in other social needs. To work as well as to march together gives scope to the creative instinct, as to the urge for unity that, in their own field, the musicians satisfy when they come together to make music.

In *The New York Times* of March 18th, 1962, appears a striking report of how a farmer's son, forced by the family's circumstances to give up his schooling at fourteen, was suddenly discovered to possess extraordinary mental powers. At twenty — last year — Jean Frene was called up for military service under French law, and given the customary tests to measure his ability to learn. The results were astounding; the officers administered tests again for corroboration: Jean Frene did even better. The director of the career guidance centre in Lyons was called in by the colonel in charge, and found on examination that never among the 40,000 persons he had studied had such mental potentialities occurred.

The colonel did something extraordinary, particularly from the French point of view: he sent the boy back to continue his education, postponing military service. In five months, the boy completed, without anv sign of strain, a course designed to fill six years.

Besides the pleasure at this instance of even the military machine being appreciative and generous, one is stirred to reflection. What is the source of such powers? Not heredity; not environment and its influences; only some source within the person can explain them. And, if extraordinary powers are congenital, where was the prior field of causation in which they were developed? A source both inward and pre-existing is indicated: an immortal soul that in some prior existence developed by effort powers that are now natural.